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Abstract 
	  
The use of proactive tactics to disrupt criminal activities, such as Terry street stops and 
concentrated misdemeanor arrests, are essential to the “new policing.”  This model 
applies complex metrics, strong management, and aggressive enforcement and 
surveillance to focus policing on high crime risk persons and places.  The tactics endemic 
to the “new policing” gave rise in the 1990s to popular, legal, political and social science 
concerns about disparate treatment of minority groups in their everyday encounters with 
law enforcement.  Empirical evidence showed that minorities were indeed stopped and 
arrested more frequently than similarly situated whites, even when controlling for local 
social and crime conditions. In this article, we examine racial disparities under a unique 
configuration of the street stop prong of the “new policing” – the inclusion of non-contact 
observations (or surveillances) in the field interrogation (or investigative stop) activity of 
Boston Police Department officers. We show that Boston Police officers focus significant 
portions of their field investigation activity in two areas: suspected and actual gang 
members, and the city’s high crime areas.  Minority neighborhoods experience higher 
levels of field interrogation and surveillance activity net of crime and other social factors. 
Relative to white suspects, Black suspects are more likely to be observed, interrogated, 
and frisked or searched controlling for gang membership and prior arrest history.  
Moreover, relative to their black counterparts, white police officers conduct high 
numbers of field investigations and are more likely to frisk / search subjects of all races.  
We distinguish between preference-based and statistical discrimination by comparing 
stops by officer-suspect racial pairs.  If officer activity is independent of officer race, we 
would infer that disproportionate stops of minorities reflect statistical discrimination. We 
show instead that officers seem more likely to investigate and frisk or search a minority 
suspect if officer and suspect race differ. We locate these results in the broader tensions 
of racial profiling that pose recurring social and constitutional concerns in the “new 
policing.” 
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1 
I.  INTRODUCTION	  
	   	  
A.  The New Policing	  
	  
 In an essay published in 2000 in the Fordham Urban Law Journal, Professor 
Philip Heymann credited the “new policing” for the sharp crime declines of the preceding 
decade.1  Heymann was not alone in noting the sea change in policing. In 1990, at the 
peak of a homicide epidemic in the U.S., Professor Herman Goldstein argued that police 
should actively engage with communities to solve the recurring problems in small places 
that were animating stubborn crime problems.2  Several scholars, including one of us, had 
argued for policing “hot spots,” an effort to bring to scale policing models that featured 
allocation principles that matched police resources to the small areas that seemed to have 
recurring crime problems.3  Some police departments had revised their strategies to target 
crime markets and other locations of recurring crime.4  Others relied on research showing 
that aggressive enforcement of minor crimes – usually through arrest – deterred crime by 
signaling the risks of detection and punishment to criminal offenders.5  	  
	  
 Professor Debra Livingston had summarized this vector of tactics that comprised 
the “new policing” in a 1997 essay, but stopped short of crediting the police for 
producing the crime decline.6 She discussed the new police focus on order maintenance 
and the aggressive enforcement of quality-of-life crimes7, on the enforcement of minor 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Phillip B. Heymann, The New Policing, 28 Fordham Urb. L.J. 407 (2000) 
2 Herman Goldstein, Improving Policing: A Problem-Oriented Approach, 25 Crime & 
Delinquency 236 (1979); Herman Goldstein, Excellence in Problem-Oriented Policing (McGraw-
Hill 1990). 
3 Lawrence W. Sherman et al., Hot Spots of Predatory Crime: Routine Activities and the 
Criminology of Place, 27 Criminology 1 (1989).  See, also, Anthony A. Braga and David 
Weisburd, Policing Problem Places: Crime Hot Spots and Effective Prevention, (Oxford 
University Press. 2010). 
4 See, e.g., Lynn Zimmer, Proactive Policing Against Street-Level Drug Trafficking, 9 American 
Journal of Police 43 (1990); David Weisburd and Lorraine Green, Policing Drug Hot Spots: The 
Jersey City DMA Experiment, 12 Justice Quarterly 711 (1995); Anthony A. Braga, et al., 
Problem-Oriented Policing in Violent Crime Places: A Randomized Controlled Experiment, 37 
Criminology 541 (1999). 
5 Robert J. Sampson and Jacqueline Cohen, Deterrent Effects of the Police on Crime: A 
Replication and Theoretical Extension, 22 Law & Society Review 163 (1988); Jacqueline Cohen 
and Jens Ludwig, Policing Crime Guns in Evaluating Gun Policy 217 (Jens Ludwig and Philip J. 
Cook, eds. 2003). 
6 Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts, 
Communities, and the New Policing, 97 Columbia Law Review 551-672 (1997) 
7 See Id. The policy also focused intensively on misdemeanor drug crimes, especially marijuana 
possession, as part of the Broken Windows strategy.  Part of the logic of such enforcement was 
also to find more serious criminal offenders among those committing such minor crimes. Jack 
Maple and Chris Mitchell, The Crime Fighter: How You Can Make Your City Safe (2000). 
Maple and Mitchell claimed that marijuana arrests would prevent more serious crimes since 
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crimes as a way to suppress more serious crimes, and on stop and frisk tactics to disrupt 
crimes and especially to seize weapons, and on new developments in community policing 
that brought police into closer collaborative relationships with citizens.  She also noted 
the importance of the strategic concentration of police resources in the city’s highest 
crime areas based on new methods of crime mapping and analysis.8   Heymann’s essay 
took a broader view, endorsing both community engagement to solve the problems that 
generated persistent crime, and prospective solutions that anticipated crime problems and 
took prophylactic steps to prevent them.9  Aggressive street stops were one of the tactics 
highlighted by both Livingston and Heymann.10	  
	  
  Heymann credited the “new policing” for the dramatic reductions in crime in the 
1990s.  He was not alone.  One study showed a sharp decline in gun violence starting in 
the early 1990s, both nationally and in New York City, and gave partial credit to new 
police tactics in New York City and elsewhere.11  Others were more full-throated in their 
endorsement of police as the essential element in crime declines. Professors George 
Kelling and Catherine Coles cited the place-based policing tactics built on Broken 
Windows theory of disorder and crime12 as the engine driving local crime declines in 
three case studies.13  Professors Hope Corman and Naci Mocan credited aggressive 
policing in the form of misdemeanor arrests for drug crimes for the reduction in murder 
and other violence in New York City the 1990s.14  Reflecting on sharp reductions in 
citizen calls for serious crimes generated by a policing disorder strategy targeted on crime 
hot spots in Lowell, Massachusetts, Professors Anthony Braga and Brenda Bond 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
marijuana smokers were criminals “on their day off” (Maple and Mitchell, The Crime Fighter, at 
155). 
8 David Weisburd, et al., Reforming to Preserve: CompStat and Strategic Problem Solving in 
American Policing, 2 Criminology & Public Policy 421 (2003).  See, also, for early experiments 
on metrics-driven proactive policing, Lawrence W. Sherman and David Weisburd, General 
Deterrent Effects of Police Patrol in Crime “Hot Spots”: A Randomized, Controlled Trial, 12 
Justice Quarterly 625 (1995); Edward McGarrell, et al., Reducing Firearms Violence through 
Directed Police Patrol, 1(1) Criminology Public Policy, 119-148 (1999); David Weisburd, et al., 
The Possible ‘Backfire’ Effects of Hot Spots Policing: An Experimental Assessment of Impacts on 
Legitimacy, Fear and Collective Efficacy, 7 Journal of Experimental Criminology 297 (2011). 
9 Heymann, The New Policing, (2000) at 424 
10 Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts, Communities, 
and the New Policing, (1997). 
11 Jeffrey Fagan, et al., Declining Homicide in New York City: A Tale of Two Trends, 88 Journal 
of Criminal Law and Criminology 1277 (1998). 
12 James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood 
Safety, March Atlantic Monthly 29 (1982). 
13 G.L. Kelling and C. Cole, Fixing Broken Windows: Restoring Order and Reducing Crime in 
American Cities, 194-235 (1996). 
14 Hope Corman and Naci Mocan, Carrots, Sticks, and Broken Windows, 48 Journal of Law and 
Economics, 235-262 (2005). 
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suggested that their results provided some support to claims that new policing strategies 
deserve some credit for reducing serious crime in New York City and elsewhere.15	  
	  
 Other scholars were less certain about the role of the police in bringing about 
crime declines during that era, citing crime declines in several cities under a variety of 
policies that varied in the centrality and tactics of the police.16  These dissenters claimed 
that comparisons with cities that used methods other than these “new policing” tactics 
enjoyed the same crime declines after controlling for the number of police and other 
correlates.  Several years later, and despite the contentious and unresolved debate over 
the effectiveness of the “new policing,” a National Academy of Sciences panel endorsed 
the “hot spots” model as the most effective and efficient approach to reducing crime.17 A 
recent systematic review of the evaluation evidence on hot spots policing also found that 
these programs generated significant reductions in crime.18 Still, research on “hot spots” 
emphasized the value of targeting places, but was largely silent on what police should do 
(tactically) in those places.	  
	  
 Three essential features characterized the “new policing.”  First, police innovators 
developed real-time policing metrics both for internal personnel management and to 
inform how and where police are deployed across their respective cities.19  Second, these 
metrics were used to hold local police commanders accountable for crime trends in their 
precincts.20  Failure to lower crime rates resulted in a form of public shaming in meetings 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Anthony A. Braga and Brenda Bond, Policing Crime and Disorder Hot Spots: A Randomized 
Controlled Trial, 46 Criminology 599 (2008). 
16 Judith A. Greene, Zero Tolerance: A Case Study of Police Practices in New York City, 45 
Crime & Delinquency 171-81 (1999); Bernard Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of 
the Social Influence of Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance 
Policing New York Style, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 377 (1998); Bernard Harcourt, Illusion of Order: the 
False Promise of Broken Windows Policing (Harvard University Press 2009); Bernard Harcourt 
and Jens Ludwig, Broken Windows: New Evidence from New York City and a Five-City 
Experiment, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 317-320 (2008); Ana Joanes, Does the New York City Police 
Department Deserve Credit for the Decline in New York City's Homicide Rates? A Cross-City 
Comparison of Policing Strategies and Homicide Rates, 33 Colum. J.L.& Soc. Probs. 303-304 
(1999); Andrew Karmen, New York Murder Mystery (2000); Jeffrey Fagan, Policing Guns and 
Youth Violence, 12 Future of Children 142 (1995); Richard Rosenfeld, et al., The Impact of 
Order-Maintenance Policing on New York City Homicide and Robbery Rates: 1988-2001, 45 
Criminology 355. But see Franklin Zimring, The Great American Crime Decline, (Oxford 
University Press 2006); Franklin Zimring, The City That Became Safe, New York and the Future 
of Crime Control (2012). For a review, see Steven D. Levitt, Understanding Why Crime Fell in 
the 1990s: Four Factors that Explain the Decline and Six that Do Not, 18 Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 171-181 (2004). 
17  Wesley Skogan and Kathleen Frydl, Fairness and Effectiveness in Policing, National 
Academies Press (2004). 
18 Anthony A. Braga, et al., The Effects of Hot Spots Policing on Crime: An Updated Systematic 
Review and Meta-Analysis, 31 Justice Quarterly 633 (2014). 
19 Heymann, supra note 6. 
20 William Bratton and Peter Knobler, Turnaround, New York (1998) 
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of high-level police executives, and possibly demotion and re-assignment. Accountability 
and heightened management control were essential tools to incentivize commanders to 
closely watch and react to local crime conditions.  	  
The third tool of the policing was the use of proactive tactics to disrupt criminal 
activities.  The U.S. Supreme Court had expanded the legal boundaries under which 
police could conduct field interrogations, or street stops, in a 1968 decision, Terry v 
Ohio.21  Terry permitted temporary stops and detentions based on reasonable suspicion 
that crime was “afoot,” supplanting the more demanding probable cause standard22 and 
memorializing police discretion as the gateway to street stops.23  Subsequent decisions 
further expanded the tolerances around the concept of “reasonable suspicion.”24 The 
“new policing” embraced the use of street stops as a critical tool to disrupt criminal 
activity, despite the absence of any evidence of the comparative advantage of street stops 
over other policing tactics.25 	  
Proactivity was the animating theory of the “new policing,” whether in the 
context of data-driven management metrics such as CompStat,26  a computerized crime 
accounting system, or in the aggressive use of arrests for minor crimes, or the conduct of 
street stops at the first signs of suspicious behavior. A Google NGram on “proactive 
policing” shows the first mentions in the late 1960s and the peak number of mentions in 
2000 before dropping slowly through 2008.27  In the current era, the term was first used 
without fanfare by Professors Jerome Skolnick and David Bayley in their description of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 368 U.S. 1, 21-2 (“The reasonableness of any particular search and seizure must be assessed in 
light of the particular circumstances against the standard of whether a man of reasonable caution 
is warranted in believing that the action taken was appropriate”.) See, infra Section II and 
accompanying notes 
22 Mapp v Ohio, 367 U.S. 632 (1960) (reaffirming the probable cause standard under the Fourth 
Amendment to justify a “search and seizure.”) 
23 Terry at 301 
24 See Section II and accompanying notes 
25 A decade later, the NRC policing panel conspicuously avoided the question of what police 
should do once they got to the targeted places. However, a recent systematic review and meta-
analysis of the effects of hot spots policing on crime suggests that community problem-solving 
approaches generated stronger crime reduction impacts relative to increased enforcement efforts. 
See Braga, et al., The Effects of Hot Spots Policing, supra note 23 at 633. 
26 David Weisburd, et al., Reforming To Preserve: CompStat and Strategic Problem Solving In 
American Policing, 2 Criminology & Public Policy 421-456 (2003) (showing that many police 
departments adopted elements of the “new policing” without incorporating the metrics-driven 
management algorithms for targeting and assessment of police actions.  In fact, the authors 
critique management metrics as a retarding organization reform and reinforcing the paramilitary 
model of police innovation). 
27  Google Ngram on Proactive Policing. Ngrams show the frequency of mentions of a word or 
phrase by year for a specified period.  See, for example, “Google Ngram Database Tracks 
Popularity Of 500 Billion Words" Huffington Post, 17 December 2010, at 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/12/17/google-ngram-database-tra_n_798150.html. The 
most common application currently is through Google’s website, a tool that was initially 
developed at the Cultural Observatory at Harvard.   
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policing innovations in the 1980s.28  New York City police first used proactive policies to 
disrupt open-air drug markets starting in the early 1990s.29  	  
Over time, proactivity became a broad umbrella for a wide range of police tactics.  
One study defines “proactive policing” as the vigorous enforcement of law against minor 
(misdemeanor) offenses.30 Other studies mention the use of stop and frisk, or 
investigative stops, as central to a proactive policing policy.”31 Still others portray a 
curious admixture of drug enforcement and community policing as “proactive.”32  
Accordingly, there is no consensus on what constitutes “proactive policing” other than its 
emphasis on anticipation of criminal activity and directing action to those places or 
persons, and its commitment to systematic criminal enforcement of minor crimes.33 
Tactics such as investigative stops (stop and frisk, or Terry stops)34, order maintenance 
and aggressive responses to quality of life enforcement, the same tactics cited by 
Livingston, are basic to proactive policing. 	  
	  
	  
B. Policing Crime, Policing Race	  
	  
 The metrics of the “new policing” pointed to the neighborhoods with the highest 
crime rates as the targets of police activity. These usually were the places with 
concentrated poverty and often were minority neighborhoods.35 At first glance, this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Jerome Skolnick and David Bayley, The New Blue Line: Police Innovation in Six American 
Cities (1986) (discussing a shift in police tactics from being reactive to crime complaints toward 
acting to response to chronic criminal problems in specific places). 
29 Zimmer, Proactive Policing, supra note 9 at 43.  
30 Charis Kubrin, et al., Proactive Policing and Robbery Rates across U.S. Cities, 48 Criminology 
57 (2010). 
31 Jeffrey Fagan, et al., Street Stops and Broken Windows Revisited: The Logic and Demography 
of Proactive Policing in a Safe and Changing City, 309 Race, Ethnicity, and Policing (Stephen 
Rice and Michael White, eds. 2010).  
32 Jon Gould and Stephen Mastrofski, Suspect Searches: Assessing Police Behavior Under the 
U.S. Constitution, 3 Criminology & Public Policy 315 (2004). 
33 The original “broken windows” essay, whose ideas informed much of the next decade of 
proactive policing, suggested that arrest was a last resort if other efforts failed to ameliorate the 
disorderly conditions that invited crime. Wilson and Kelling, Broken Windows, supra note 17 at 
29. By 2000, Kelling had embraced the notion of using arrest authority systematically and 
aggressively to stop minor crime from growing into more serious crime patterns and problems.  
See, Kelling and Coles, Fixing Broken Windows, supra note 18 at 108-156. 
34 See, infra Section II and accompanying notes. 
35 Jeffrey Fagan and Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken Windows: Terry, Race, and Disorder 
in New York City, 28 Fordham Urban L.J. 457 (2000); Lauren J. Krivo, et al., Segregation, Racial 
Structure, and Neighborhood Violent Crime, 114 American Journal of Sociology 1765-1802 
(2009). See, also, Robert Sampson and Jeffrey Morenoff, Durable Inequality: Spatial Dynamics, 
Social Processes and the Persistence of Poverty in Chicago Neighborhoods, 176 Poverty Traps 
(Samuel Bowles et al., eds. 2006). 
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seems a rational and proportional response, consistent with most benchmarking strategies 
to assess fairness or bias.36  Yet, regardless of the distribution and allocation function to 
assign police to neighborhoods – a linear allocation of police to neighborhoods based on 
differences in their crime rates, for example – disproportionate allocations raise both 
fairness and efficiency questions.  In such instances, minority citizens are exposed to 
“more” policing than their crime conditions would dictate, and persons in other 
neighborhoods placed at risk due to under- or de-policing of their neighborhoods. 
Assuming limits on the effectiveness of police in an area – after all, there is only so much 
crime to go around – then over-policing risks adverse consequences from unnecessary 
and unproductive police contacts.  And since these stops are neither pleasant nor without 
consequences37, allocations framed this way raise constitutional questions of disparate 
treatment.38	  
	  
The fact remains that prophylactic police street stops and misdemeanor arrests 
typically are concentrated in those areas by design, creating ambivalence and anger 
among local residents.  The anger stemmed from two sources.  First, while welcoming 
police presence, local residents also became angered at the harsh tone and style of 
investigative stops.39  In the “new policing,” involuntary police-citizen contacts rarely 
were gentle or neutral, nor were they intended to be that way.40   Interviews across cities 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Greg Ridgeway and John MacDonald, Methods for Assessing Racially Biased Policing 180 
Race, Ethnicity, and Policing (Stephen Rice and Michael White, eds. 2010); Jeffrey Fagan, Law, 
Social Science, and Racial Profiling, 4 Justice Research and Policy 104 (2002); Ian Ayres, 
Outcome Tests of Racial Disparities in Police Practices 4 Justice Research and Policy 133 
(2002). See also, Lawrence Rosenthal, The Crime Drop and the Fourth Amendment: Toward an 
Empirical Jurisprudence of Search and Seizure, 29 N.Y.U. Review of Law & Social Change 641 
(2004-2005) 
37 Tom R. Tyler, Jeffrey Fagan, and Amanda B. Geller, Street Stops and Police Legitimacy: 
Teachable Moments in Young Urban Men’s Legal Socialization, 11 Journal of Empirical Legal 
Studies 751 (2014).  Amanda Geller, Jeffrey Fagan and Tom R. Tyler, Aggressive Policing and 
the Mental Health of Young Urban Men, 104 American Journal of Public Health 2121 (2014). 
38 See, See Floyd v City of New York, 959 F Supp 2d 540, 30-49 (SDNY 2013).  See, also, Jeffrey 
Fagan, Greg Conyers, and Ian Ayres, No Runs, Few Hits, and Many Errors: Street Stops, Bias 
and Proactive Policing, Presented at the Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, University of 
California, Berkeley, November 2014. 
39 See, e.g., Ronald Weitzer and Steven A. Tuch. Race and Policing In America: Conflict And 
Reform (Cambridge University Press, 2006) (showing racial differences in evaluations of police 
based on perceptions and experiences with police misconduct).  See, also, Ronald Weitzer & 
Steven A. Tuch, Perceptions of Racial Profiling: Race, Class, and Personal Experience, 40 
Criminology 435 (2002); Tom R. Tyler, Jeffrey Fagan and Amanda B. Geller, Street Stops and 
Legitimacy: Teachable Moments in Young Urban Men's Legal Socialization, 11 Journal of 
Empirical Legal Studies 751 (2014).  
40 Jack Maple and Chris Mitchell, The Crime Fighter, 2000 at 151; Roger Matthews, Replacing 
‘Broken Windows’: Crime, Incivilities, and Urban Change, in Issues in Realist Criminology 
(Roger Matthews, ed.) 35 (1992). See, also, The Nation, The Hunted and the Hated: An Inside 
Look at the NYPD’s Stop-and-Frisk Policy (Oct 9, 2012), online at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7rWtDMPaRD8 (visited Nov 2, 2014) (presenting audio tape 
recorded by Alvin Cruz during one of his multiple stops. After a physical struggle instigated by 
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with Black and Latino young persons reveal similar stories of violence, property 
destruction, racial and sexual degradation, and unlawful detentions as routine experiences 
in their encounters with police.41  Similar reports came from studies of highway stops, 
where drivers were humiliated in the course of unproductive pretextual stops and car 
searches.42  A 2012 study by the Civilian Complaint Review Board in New York City 
shows that the police precincts with the highest number of civilian complaints against 
officers had the highest stop and frisk rates.43  The same study showed that 25-30 percent 
of all complaints alleged abuse of authority by police when conducting these street 
encounters.44  Commissioner William Bratton recently summed up these noxious 
interactions as “lawful but awful.”45	  
	  
 A second source of resentment and anger resulted from the poor returns from 
these unpleasant interactions.46  In Philadelphia, New York, and Los Angeles, hundreds 
of thousands of stops resulted in few seizures of weapons or other contraband.47   A 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the police officer and his sergeant, Cruz asked for the reason why the officers were arresting him. 
One replied: “For being a fucking mutt!”). See, also, Peter Moskos, Cop in the Hood (2008) at 
114-115; Bernard E. Harcourt, Unconstitutional Police Searches and Collective Responsibility, 3 
Criminology & Public Policy 363, 366–67 (2004) (describing how community policing officers 
invoked a drug-enforcement rationale to stop a suspect without any indicia of drug use or 
possession and proceeded to conduct a fruitless cavity search).  
41 See, Rod K. Brunson and Ronald Weitzer, Police Relations with Black and White Youths in 
Different Urban Neighborhoods, 44 Urban Affairs Review 858, 866–68 (2009) (reporting that 
routine use of violence by officers in conducting investigative stops). See also generally Victor 
M. Rios, Punished: Policing the Lives of Black and Latino Boys (2011) (describing the gratuitous 
humiliation by police during investigative stops by police officers such as waiting until youths 
purchased food before seizing it for search and throwing it on the ground); Patrick Carr, et al., We 
Never Call the Cops and Here is Why: A Qualitative Examination of Legal Cynicism in Three 
Philadelphia Neighborhoods, 45 Criminology 701 (2007). 
42 Charles Epp, et al., Pulled Over: Racial Framing of Police Stops (2013) (describing racial 
degradation and racially selective enforcement in stops and searches in vehicle highway stops) 
43 Jennifer Cunningham, Complaints against NYPD Cops Mirror Stop-and-Frisk Numbers, New 
York Daily News, July 2, 2013, at http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/brooklyn/complaints-
cops-mirror-stop-and-frisk-numbers-article-1.1388735.  
44 NYC Civilian Complaint Review Board, Stop, Question and Frisk, July 2013, at 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/ccrb/html/stop/stop.shtml  
45 Bratton characterized the July 2014 killing of Eric Garner by Officer Daniel Pantaleo by a 
chokehold as “lawful but awful,” summarizing the decision of the Grand Jury to not indict the 
officer.  See, http://www.cbsnews.com/videos/nypd-commissioner-department-reviewing-eric-
garner-case/ (December 7, 2015).  He repeated the phrase again on February 13, 2015, to 
characterize stop and frisk tactics and other order maintenance policing actions that are the core 
features of the New York City policing model, and to acknowledge the racial animosity that such 
tactics engender.  See, http://www.cbsnews.com/videos/nypd-commissioner-fbi-directors-
comments-on-police-minority-relations-resonate/  
46 See Section XX and accompanying notes, infra, on dignitarian concerns 
47 Jeffrey Fagan and John MacDonald, Policing, Crime and Legitimacy in New York and Los 
Angeles: The Uncertain Future (D. Halle and A. Beveridge, eds. 2013). Ian Ayres and Jonathan 
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federal civil rights trial in New York revealed that the burden for the extremely low gun 
or other contraband seizure rates – about one gun for every 1,000 stops, one drug seizure 
for every 100 stops – fell primarily on African American and Latino persons.48  Highway 
stops generated similarly poor returns in drug seizures, again in a regime where stops and 
searches were conducted with African American and Latino motorists.49 One study 
showed lower “hit rates” of drug seizures from minority motorists on New Jersey 
highways by the State Police despite the higher number of stops of those drivers.50 Drug 
searches on the streets and highways were particularly irritating for minority citizens 
given the racial balance in the use of controlled substances.51 	  
	  
Overall, the poor returns from these stops, both on the streets and highways 
coupled with their racial concentration led to bitterness and a racial divide in distrust of 
legal authorities, especially the police.52  The persistence of these errors in the context of 
the extensive use of these tactics suggests that these practices and disparities took on the 
characteristics of a government program rather than the exercise of individual officers’ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Borowsky. A Study of Racially Disparate Outcomes in the Los Angeles Police Department, 
ACLU of Southern California (2008), at http://www.aclusocal.org/documents/view/47.  See, also,  
Settlement Agreement and Consent Decree, Mahari Bailey et al. v. City of Philadelphia et al.,  
C.A. No. 10-5952 (E.D.Pa) 
48 Floyd opinion.  See, infra sections II.B and accompanying notes. 
49 Billy Close and Patrick Mason, Searching for Efficient Enforcement: Officer Characteristics 
and Racially Biased Policing, 3 Review of Law and Economics 263 (2007); Samuel Gross and 
Katherine Barnes, Road Work: Racial Profiling and Drug Interdiction on the Highway, 101 
Michigan Law Review 653 (2002); Samuel Gross and Debra Livingston, Racial Profiling Under 
Attack, 102 Columbia Law Review 1413 (2002).  But see John Knowles, Nicola Persico and Petra 
Todd, Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle Searches, 109 Journal of Political Economy 203 (2002). See, 
generally, Steven Durlauf, Assessing Racial Profiling, 116 Economic Journal 368-384 (on the 
normative and moral dimensions of a racially skewed yet inefficient regime of street and highway 
stops). 
50 Jeffrey Fagan and Amada Geller, Profiling and Consent: Stops, Searches and Seizures after 
Soto (2010), at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1641326.  The New Jersey 
State Police were operating under a federal court order and consent decree resulting from a 
pattern and practice of racially targeted vehicle stops and searches.  See, U.S. v. State of New 
Jersey, CIVIL NO. 99-5970(MLC) (December 31, 1999) 
51 Data from the National Survey of Drug Use and Health (NSDUH) showed very small 
differences in marijuana use rates between black and white teenagers, and lower rates among 
Hispanics.  2004 and 2005 NSDUH data from the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services 
Administration (SAMHSA) reports that 6.7% of whites in large metropolitan counties report past-
month marijuana use, while 7.9% of blacks and 4.9% of Hispanics do. Reports in the same 
surveys of cocaine and heroin use show similar balance across racial and ethnic groups. 
52 David Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why “Driving While Black” Matters, 84 
Minn. L. Rev. 265; Tom R.Tyler and Yuen J. Huo, Trust in the Law: Encouraging Public 
Cooperation with the Police and Courts (Russell Sage Foundation, 2002); Ronald Weitzer and 
Steven Tuch, Race and Policing in America: Conflict and Reform (Cambridge University Press, 
2006). 
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judgment and discretion.53  These stories became common knowledge, fueled in part by 
the quick media dissemination of images and details of tragic events.54  Word spread fast.  
The effects of well-publicized troubling events in police misconduct were felt and shared 
vicariously beginning with the Rodney King video as these depictions traveled through 
information networks in digital sources.55 Whether directly or vicariously affected, the 
shared experiences from interactions with the police contributed to a broad perception 
that racial profiling was deeply rooted in law enforcement treatments of minorities.56 The 
subjective perception of racially selective enforcement and harsh treatment among 
African Americans and Latinos gave rise to policy, constitutional and political questions 
of racial profiling.57	  
	  
C.  Is it Bias?	  
	  
 The debate on whether or how bias infects the street stop prong of the “new 
policing” has occupied both litigation and social science.  The large number of court-
sanctioned consent decrees and other policing litigation outcomes over the past two 
decades suggests that in many places, the practice of street stops produces racial 
disparities that meet the constitutional standard for disparate treatment or racially 
selective enforcement.58  But given differences in race-specific rates of violent and other 
serious crime,59 the question of bias either institutionally or among individual officers is 
more difficult to discern.  Disparities need not reflect either bias or even 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Tracey, Programming Errors: Understanding the Constitutionality of Stop-and-Frisk as a 
Program, Not an Incident, 82 University of Chicago L. Rev. 176 (2015). 
54 Rod K. Brunson, “Police Don’t Like Black People”: African-American Young Men’s 
Accumulated Police Experiences, 6 Criminology & Public Policy 71, 85 (2007).  
55 Lynn, Elber, Rodney King Beating Helped Drive Citizen Journalism, Viral Video Revolution, 
Huffington Post (2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/18/rodney-king-beating-citizen-
journalism-viral-video_n_1606993.html? 
56 Epp et al., supra note 42; Lawrence Bobo and Devon Johnson, A Taste for Punishment: Black 
and White Americans’ Views on the Death Penalty and the War on Drugs, 1 DuBois Review 170 
(2004). 
57 Jerome Skolnick and Abigail Caplovits, Guns, Drugs and Profiling, 43 Ariz. L. Rev. 413, 416-
7 (2001) (discussing a pattern of citizen complaints, litigation, low poll ratings and widespread 
protests, and other signs of discontent with policing that crystalized in the term “racial profiling.”) 
58 See, U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Bureau, Special Litigation Section for a list of 
consent decrees and other investigation outcomes alleging civil rights violations including equal 
protection violations under 42 U.S.C. § 14141, at 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/findsettle.php#police.  See, also, Civil Rights Litigation 
Clearinghouse, University of Michigan Law School, at 
http://www.clearinghouse.net/results.php?ct=PN  
59 Robert J, Sampson and William Julius Wilson, Toward a Theory of Race, Crime, and Urban 
Inequality, in Crime and Inequality (John Hagan and Ruth D. Peterson, eds. 1995) 37-56; 
Anthony Braga and Rod Brunson, The Police and Public Discourse on Black-on-Black Violence, 
5-11 New Perspectives on Policing Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, National 
Institute of Justice, NCJ 248588 (2015). 
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disproportionality.  Elevated rates of stops or discretionary arrests or other police actions 
could reflect a rational strategy of officers to maximize public safety.  But those rates 
could also reflect either the individual or aggregate actions of police officers with a taste 
for punishment.  	  
	  
Disparate treatment is an observable fact, but the whether it is motivated by 
implicit bias, policy, or rational preferences raises additional questions and distinct 
research strategies focusing more closely on the connections between officers’ (and 
police executives’) perceptions and their actions.  The biases could be explicit, or they 
may be implicit biases among officers which animate them to see either culpability60 or 
suspicion more often among minorities and in minority neighborhoods, and more 
important, to translate that suspicion into action.61 Some studies have used officer race as 
a control to estimate officer bias.  These studies assume that officers’ within-race 
encounters will differ from cross-race encounters in decisions both on how to conduct the 
encounter and the outcome of the encounter.  	  
	  
Court rulings often skirt the question of whether bias is the dynamic that produces 
disparities, preferring instead to examine discriminatory intent.  The Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause forbids state actors from denying the equal 
protection of the law.62 Intentional discrimination by race is the standard, not simply 
whether a policy or practice has a disproportionate racial impact.63  Whether that intent is 
a matter of bias or preferences is not central to a legal determination, intent instead is the 
predicate to determine discrimination. Courts have developed standards to establish 
discriminatory intent that would satisfy an equal protection claim, such as intentionally 
classifying persons by race for differential treatment.64  The standard most applicable for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Sandra Graham and Brian S. Lowery, Priming Unconscious Racial Stereotypes About 
Adolescent Offenders, 28 Law and Human Behavior 483-504 (2004); Jennifer Eberhardt, et al., 
Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology 876-893 (2004). 
61 Rebecca Wickes, et al., “Seeing” Minorities and Perceptions of Disorder: Explicating the 
Mediating and Moderating Mechanisms of Social Cohesion, 51 Criminology 519 (2013) (shows 
that residents report high levels of disorder in places with greater concentrations of minorities 
even after controlling for objective indicators of crime or disorder.  See, also, Robert J. Sampson 
and Steven Raudenbush, Seeing disorder: Neighborhood stigma and the social construction of 
“broken windows.” 67 Social Psychology Quarterly 319–42 (2004); Lincoln Quillian and Devah 
Pager, Black Neighbors, Higher Crime? 107 American Journal of Sociology 717–67 (2001); 
Geoffrey Alpert, John H. MacDonald, and Roger G. Dunham, Police Suspicion and 
Discretionary Decision Making During Citizen Stops, 43 Criminology 407-434 (2005). Douglas 
A. Smith, The Neighborhood Contexts of Police Behavior, 8 Crime and Justice 329-333 (1986). 
62 U.S. Const. Amend. XIV § 1 
63 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239–40 (1976). 
64 See, for example, Brown v. City of Oneonta, New York, 221 F.3d 329 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(permitting a permissible racial classification for police only when police are pursuing a person 
meeting a specific suspect description).  Normally, all such classifications are evaluated at the 
highest standard of strict scrutiny.  See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); Johnson 
v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005) (holding that “all racial classification” imposed by 
government “must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny”)). 
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contemporary policing is an “as applied” determination: that a seemingly neutral policy is 
applied in an intentionally discriminatory manner.65  Courts have argued that an equal 
protection claim is satisfied by evidence of a discriminatory “purpose” as a “motivating 
factor” for the practice under scrutiny.66 The question of bias is secondary to the question 
of the complex task of discerning discriminatory intent. In the case of a widespread 
program67 of Terry stops or street stops, an intentionally disproportionate application of 
the stop authority to persons of one race raises the specter of intent.	  
	  
Courts that find constitutional violations on race generally apply a standard of 
“preponderance of evidence” –often based on statistical analyses – to decide equal 
protection – or disparate treatment – violations in policing cases.  The evidence in these 
cases is usually based on specific studies that reflect the institutional, criminological and 
sociological conditions in each place.  Still, there remain several empirical challenges to 
detecting bias in the institutional practices of law enforcement agencies and in the actions 
of individual police officers. Control groups, benchmarks to assess proportionality, 
endogeneity of crime and policing, varying spatial boundaries, individual biases versus 
institutional practices, police-citizen interpersonal interactions, characteristics of officers 
and the composition of both the civilian and police populations, multiple outcomes of 
stops and processes within stops, and several important contextual factors all contribute 
to the challenges facing researchers.  All these parameters are basic to design decisions in 
assessing the extent of police discrimination.  Designs focusing on specific cities are 
essential to assess the unique policy contexts in these places.  	  
	  
	  
D. Stops and Stares: The Surveillance Prong of the “New Policing”	  
	  
 In this article, we examine the extent of racial disparities under a unique 
configuration of the street stop prong of the “new policing” – the use of Field 
Interrogation, Observation, Frisk and/or Search (BPD form 2487; hereafter, FIO) reports 
by the Boston Police Department (BPD).  As in many other big cities, the Boston FIO 
strategy included the basic element of investigative stops or field interrogations as a 
staple of its proactive tactics.   
 Beyond this core tactic, however, two additional components distinguish the 
Boston design from most forms of the “new policing.”  First, Boston officers conduct 
non-contact observations of known criminal offenders or others gathering in known 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 See, for example, Brown v Oneonta, id at 337.  See, also, Yick Wo v Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 
(1886). 
66 See, Floyd v. City of New York, supra 38 at 29 (quoting Village of Arlington Heights v. 
Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-266 (1977): 
“Because discriminatory intent is rarely susceptible to direct proof, litigants may make “a 
sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be 
available. The impact of the official action — whether it bears more heavily on one race 
than another — may provide an important starting point.” 
67 Meares, Programming Errors (2015), supra 58. 
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crime locations.  Officers are required to complete FIO reports for both in-person 
encounters and non-contact observations. Officers are required to enter the information 
from non-contact observations or surveillance in the same databases that house data from 
field interrogations (or investigative stops).68  Department policy requires that 
observations be more than a stakeout or a hunch.  That is, the observation must be 
specific to a suspected crime, rather than general surveillance of individuals.69  Whether 
that stipulation is honored in practice is doubtful, as we show later on.	  
 Second, the policy explicitly recognizes the role of surveillance and intelligence-
gathering in the local strategy.70  Surveillance of known offenders and their associates 
and their gathering places “plays an important part in the department’s intelligence efforts 
to collect and disseminate data on the activities and whereabouts of known and suspected 
criminals and their associates in the city.”71  In effect, the strategy allows the department 
to build a network database of the movements and associations of individuals through 
time and space in the city. The observations also are considered documentary evidence 
and therefore admissible if relevant in any future proceedings.72	  
 Few police departments have acknowledged the potential for intelligence-
gathering that is created from Terry stops, much less how the data could be aggregated 
and analyzed for that purpose. Even fewer acknowledge the Fourth Amendment 
implications on privacy and anonymity.73 While intelligence-gathering is not unusual in 
policing in response to known crime groups such as street gangs or drug selling 
organizations,74 the transformation of Terry stops into an intelligence regime seems 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 See, Boston Police Department, Special Order SO 05-023, June 3, 2005, Sec. 1:  “An officer 
should….complete an FIOFS report whenever (a) he/she observes an individual who (sic) the 
officer knows to have a criminal record.”   
69 Id. at Sec. 4: “An officer shall complete an FIOFS report whenever: (a) he/she observes, 
detains, or interrogates a person suspected of unlawful design….The officer must enter the type 
of crime suspected….[I]t is not sufficient to simply enter ‘suspicious person’ or ‘SP’).”  See, also, 
Boston Police Department, Rules and Procedures, Rule 323 (March 9, 2011). 
70 Special Order SO -5-023, at Sec. 1: “The FIOFS report has been prepared so that the 
department may accumulate up-to-date information concerning known criminals and their 
associates, the vehicles they use, the places they frequent, and persons suspected of unlawful 
design.” 
71 Id. at General Considerations. 
72 Boston Police Department, Rules and Procedures, Rule 323, Section 1. 
73 Christopher Slobogin, Privacy at Risk: The New Government Surveilllance and the Fourth 
Amendment, 79 (2007).  See, specifically, Chapter 4, Public Privacy: Surveillance of Public 
Places and the Right to Anonymity (discussing the elasticity of the reasonable suspicion prong of 
Fourth Amendment doctrine to accommodate contemporary surveillance practices by police of 
gang members and others suspected of potential criminal participation). 
74 William Bloss, Escalating U.S. Surveillance after 9/11: An Examination of Causes and Effects, 
4 Surveillance & Society 208 (2002) (documenting the expansion of police surveillance in 
response to perceived threats from crime, drug selling and national security concerns).  See, also, 
Debra Livingston, Gang Loitering, the Court, and Some Realism about Police Patrol, Supreme 
Court Review 141 (1999) (expressing concern that granting police authority to focus on public 
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somewhat new.  While surveillance of individuals or gangs is permissible, surveillance 
without a warrant for places and persons wandering through them raises constitutional 
concerns.75	  
 Pretextual stops made on thin grounds for reasonable suspicion76 can create 
opportunities to record time-place-network activities of suspected offenders or other 
valued targets such as gang members or drug traffickers. Surveillance without contact is 
another matter.  Recorded observations by officers who have knowledge of the identity 
and affiliations of that target can in effect double down on the information gathered 
through in-person contacts.  These non-contact observations can in fact lead to further 
contacts, assuming usable intelligence that can be linked to specific persons or groups.77  
For example, the U.S. Customs service, under former NYPD Commissioner Raymond 
Kelly, used “intelligence developed by another officer” to target persons for searches.78	  
 The observational or intelligence components of the “new policing” have received 
little attention in either legal or empirical scholarship on policing, or on the constitutional 
implications of these types of “passive” stops.  Certainly, there are Fourth Amendment 
implications when police use prior suspicionless observations as a partial basis for a later 
interdiction that risks arrest and its aftermath.79  Chicago’s constitutional troubles with its 
gang loitering ordinance show the difficult line that police face when determining when 
to escalate observation of non-criminal conduct such as loitering into reasonable 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
spaces can evolve into policing as an instrument for surveillance and harassment of “disfavored” 
individuals or groups.) 
75 See, generally, Orin Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional 
Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 801 (2004); Katz v. U.S. 389 U.S. 347 
(finding that there is no Fourth Amendment violation when evidence is obtained without 
“physical entrance into the area”); But see Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (holding 
that the use of a thermal imaging device from a public position to monitor the radiation of heat 
from a person's home was a "search" under the Fourth Amendment, and thus required a warrant). 
76 See, e.g., R. Richard Banks, Beyond Profiling: Race, Policing and the War on Drugs, 56 Stan. 
L. Rev. 571 (2003); Jeffrey Fagan and Amanda B. Geller, Following the Script 82 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
51 (2015). 
77 Since there is no seizure of the subject, Terry’s ground rules for street detentions may not be 
applicable to non-contact observations. Yet observations can be bootstrapped by police officers 
into information that can serve as the basis for the reasonable suspicion that Terry requires. See, 
Terry v Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) 
78 United States General Accounting Office, Better Targeting of Airline Passengers for Personal 
Searches Could Produce Better Results, GAO/GGD-00-38, 87 (2000), at 5-6, 16 (cited in Jerome 
Skolnick and Abigail Caplovits, Guns, Drugs and Profiling, 43 Ariz. L. Rev. 413, 433 (2001)) 
79 See, Commonwealth v. Cruz, 945 N.E.2d 899, 908 (Mass. 2011).  Cruz was ordered to exit a 
vehicle when police officers spotted it parked next to a fire hydrant and then smelled marijuana 
smoke.  Possession of small amounts of marijuana had been decriminalized in Massachusetts 
since 2008. Cruz had fallen under the police gaze in this instance because of his prior encounters 
with police, and those encounters heightened their suspicion leading to the search of the vehicle 
for what amounts to a civil infraction.  See, also, David Keenan and Tina M. Thomas, Redefining 
Fourth Amendment Reasonableness: A Crime-Severity Model for Terry Stops, 123 Yale L.J. 1448 
(2013).  
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suspicion of a crime that would justify a coercive stop.80  If there is no notice to citizens 
about what conduct might authorize police attention, it may be equally unclear to the 
police.  There also are distinct Equal Protection implications when individuals are 
disproportionately targeted by race for observations that can lead to more intrusive or 
coercive police actions in the short term.  Racial disparities in this passive component of 
the new policing would be compounded in subsequent police contacts, given the 
leveraging of intelligence into further stop activity.  The deeper (though not wider)81 pool 
of information may well increase the odds of an in-person contact, raising additional 
questions about disparities and the potential for a constitutional claim. 	  
 Surveillance is fundamental to the street stop component of the “new policing.” 
The sequence of interactions leading to an investigative stop, or a contact stop, often 
include a period of observation of a suspect before an officer decides if there is sufficient 
suspicion under the Fourth Amendment to proceed to contact and interaction with the 
suspect.82  In most places, these predicate observations are not recorded if the 
surveillance doesn’t convert to a contact stop; only those observations that trigger actions 
are included in databases.83  This is what sets the Boston FIO regime apart from other 
forms of the new policing: its expansion under Fourth Amendment ground rules to 
include surveillance of the type that normally is reserved for national security concerns or 
complex criminal organizations.  Here, the everyday movements of persons fall under the 
police gaze and are memorialized in databases. Whether these observations are 
contributory to disparate treatment under the Equal Protection clause on their own or in 
conjunction with direct contacts is the focus of this paper.	  
 	  
E.  This Article	  
	  
 Empirical tests for Equal Protection violations in policing have become more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Morales v City of Chicago, 521 U.S 41 (holding that a gang loitering ordinance is vague as to 
what behaviors would be actionable for police and therefore encourages arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement).  See, Livingston, Gang Loitering, supra note 78 at 163 and 
accompanying notes.   
81 The pool is deeper in the sense that more information is gathered about the same person or 
persons over time.  But if an area or group is targeted, the information is narrowly focused on 
person or one social network or one or more groups of persons moving through a targeted space.  
While Wardlow requires presence in a high crime area as an component of suspicion, passive 
stops based on presence in a high crime area de-temporize that presence and disconnect it from 
other indicia of suspicion that are present at the time of the street stop. See, Illinois v Wardlow, 
528 U.S. 119 (2000). 
82 See, Jeffrey Fagan and Amanda Geller, Following the Script, supra note 80.  
83 See, for example, NYPD SQF database, various years, at 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/analysis_and_planning/stop_question_and_frisk_report.shtm
l. The databases include only in-person stops or field interrogations.  For each stop, the period of 
observation preceding the stop is also recorded.  Nearly all of the observation periods are less 
than two minutes.  Fagan and Geller, Following the Script, supra note 80. 
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common and urgent as political and legal challenges to the “new policing” have grown.84  
Research to date on vehicle and highway stops raises difficult questions as to the 
construction and vetting of claims of racial discrimination. These difficulties have been 
compounded and perhaps have become more complex with the increase in attention to 
policing inequalities by the U.S. Department of Justice,85 and civil litigation on a variety 
of statutory and constitutional grounds.86 These cases have generated new databases and 
competing analytic strategies to identify the causal role of race in the observed disparities 
in policing. In this article, we examine the role of race in explaining how pre-arrest 
coercive policing and passive surveillance-based policing are carried out in an urban 
setting of complex and varied crime problems.  	  
	  
 The addition of passive or surveillance-based policing models expands the 
underlying normative tensions in policing by placing citizens under the police gaze in a 
setting more closely approximating a panopticonistic vision of policing.87  Police 
surveillance of organized crime groups and political dissidents has a long history, with 
court interventions that established procedural and substantive boundaries on these 
activities.88  Incorporating surveillance into a prophylactic Terry regime, whether for 
street gangs or other loosely organized offender networks or for everyday criminal or 
delinquent activity, merges acute public safety and national security concerns into 
everyday policing. This spillover from national security to the “new policing,” raises 
important questions about how equal protection doctrine applies.  The further dimension 
of racial disparity that seems inherent in street stop regimes, deepens the stakes in this 
analysis of the “new policing” by linking race and national security rationales.89   	  
	  
 The article unfolds in the following five sections.  Section II provides background 
on the transformation of police and the emergence of proactive policing since Terry.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Sonja B. Starr, Explaining Race Gaps in Policing: Normative and Empirical Challenges.  Stan. 
L. Rev. (2015, forthcoming) 
85 Rachel Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights through Proactive Policing Reform, 62 Stan. L.Rev. 1-
68 (2009) (discussing the limitations of “retail” litigation under §1983 and other individual cases 
to produce institutional reform in policing and arguing for the stronger, institutionally-focused 
mechanisms of 42 U.S.C. § 14141 to produce meaningful institutional changes.) 
86 Joanna Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 NYU L. Rev. 885 (2014) (showing results of 
litigation under Monell liability claims for police misconduct). 
87 William Simon, In Defense of the Panopticon. Columbia Public Law Research Paper 14-412 
(2014) (arguing for the social welfare and regulatory benefits of neutral broad surveillance 
including the police as governmental actors.).  Peter K. Manning, A View of Surveillance, in 
Technocrime: Technology, Crime and Social Control 209-242 (2008).  See, See, generally, Larry 
Catá Backer, Global Panopticism: States, Corporations, and the Governance Effects of 
Monitoring Regimes, 15 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 101, 112 (2008) (tracing modern decentralized 
and globalized surveillance state).  
88 Benjamin S. Mishkin, Filling the Oversight Gap: The Case for Local Intelligence Oversight, 88 
NYU L. Rev. 1414 (2013). 
89 Paul Chevigny and Paui Chevigny, The Edge of the Knife: Police Violence in the Americas 
(New York Press, 1995). 
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Despite the efforts of the Terry court to scrub race from its analysis of the original Terry 
stop, the role of race in the jurisprudence of Terry stops has become clearer over time, 
leading to the important cases today that closely connect Terry, race and proactive 
policing.  We trace the political and normative conflicts over racial profiling into the 
courts, and also into the sociological analysis of race and policing.  We draw a distinction 
between discrimination and bias, and show the divide in empirical strategies to test the 
two explanations of observed racial disparities.	  
	  
 Section III describes in detail the research site, and the integration of surveillance 
into the regime of proactive policing in Boston.  Section IV discusses the research 
strategy to identify the role of race in producing the patterns of policing that we observe 
in Boston.  We weigh alternatives facing empirical researchers in measurement and 
analysis of these data and explain the methodological choices that we made.   We 
distinguish the role of race in surveillance versus in-person encounters.  We discuss the 
use of officer race as a metric to identify the extent of racial preferences among officers.  
We also discuss modeling choices for data where policing is spatially disaggregated 
across parts of the city that vary extensively in their social and crime condition.	  
	  
 Section V presents the empirical results.  We show that contact stops and non-
contact observations of Black suspects are more common than for white suspects after 
controlling for local crime and social conditions in Boston neighborhoods.  The patterns 
are robust to several alternate empirical specifications.  The local emphasis on 
surveillance and interdiction of gang members explains some but not all of the racial 
disparities in the conduct of FIO’s; these disparities are present across most tactical units 
and locales in the BPD. Diversity in policing matters in these estimates: Black officers 
appear to be less active in FIO reporting than their white colleagues, both in general 
patrol activities as well as in the specialized gang enforcement units.  They make fewer 
stops of Black suspects and search Black suspects less often. The results suggest that 
Black and Hispanic officers seem to act with statistical discrimination whereas White 
officers seem to act based on preferences for discrimination that are present beyond what 
statistical discrimination would suggest.  We show continuity in racial disparities in 
police contacts from the general Terry regime of street stops to the expanded surveillance 
activities, indicative of the broader expansion of Terry doctrine over the past half century.	  
	  
 We conclude in Section VI with a discussion two intersecting implications of this 
case study: efficiency and fairness.  As a preliminary question, we assess the adequacy 
and probative of this empirical strategy to detect equal protection violations in the 
conduct of stops coupled with a more arms-length program of surveillance.  The new 
policing inevitably will produce racially disparate impacts, given crime patterns and the 
actuarialism that is baked into its strategy and logic.  Its expansion to surveillance, which 
sidesteps Terry’s rules, raises new questions about the constitutional regulation of the 
“new policing.”  The devolution of Terry to a program of both surveillance and 
administrative stops raises important questions for the regulation of this activity and more 
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broadly for the governance of police with respect both to privacy considerations and for 
its racial dimensions.90	  
	  
	  
II. INVESTIGATIVE STOPS IN AMERICAN POLICING	  
	  
A. Terry v. Ohio and the Re-invention of Police Street Stops	  
	  
 Investigative stops have been a staple of American policing since the first 
municipal police departments were formed in the 19th century, when slave patrols first 
roamed the streets of Northern U.S. cities checking the credentials of African Americans 
to verify their status as free men.91  For the first century of urban policing, there was little 
constitutional or political regulation of stops, nor of other police procedures including 
searches, arrests and interrogations.92  By the late 1950s, at the outset of the civil rights 
era in American political and legal culture and with the beginnings of an uptick in urban 
crime, investigative stops and searches had become a contentious fact of policing.93  As 
public discourse about crime became increasingly racialized in that era, civil rights 
advocates framed these issues not only in terms of the limits of state intrusions on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 William J. Stuntz, The Distribution of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 
1265 (1998-9). 
91 H.M. Henry, The Police Control of the Slave in South Carolina (Vanderbilt University, 1914).  
As Tracey Maclin points out, the racial profiling debate involves practices that date back to 
colonial times. Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 333, 336 
(1998) ("Today, police departments across the nation... continue to target blacks in a manner 
reminiscent of the slave patrols of colonial America.").   See John S. Dempsey and Linda S. 
Forst, An Introduction to Policing 10 (2011) (“Policing experts conclude . . . that the patrol 
function and concept were first accepted as a police practice by slave patrols in the South.”). 
Victor E. Kappeler and Larry K. Gaines, Community Policing:  A Contemporary Perspective 62 
(6th ed., 2011) (describing slave patrols as precursors to modern-day police departments); Michael 
J. Palmiotto & N. Prabha Unnithan, Policing and Society: A Global Approach 172 (Cengage 
Learning, 2010) (discussing slave patrols and noting that “America’s experience with police-race 
relations can be traced back to 1619 when the first slaves from Africa arrived in Jamestown.”).  
Sally E. Hadden, Slave Patrols: Law and Violence in Virginia and the Carolinas 19 (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2001) (“The disparity between what masters would allow slaves 
(typically, a Sunday free from work and a pass to visit town) and what the town might tolerate . . . 
generated security concerns.”). 
92 There was some constitutional regulation of police interaction with minors in the years first half 
of the 20th century.  In Haley v Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948), the Supreme Court found that a 
confession obtained from a 15 year old African American boy who was interrogated from 
midnight to 5AM by a relay of police detective was invalid.  The court ruled that Haley’s 14th 
Amendment due process rights were violated when police failed to advise the boy of his rights.  
The Court noted that “[a]ge 15 is a tender and difficult age for a boy of any race” and that a boy 
in his position was “no match for the police” in the “overpowering presence of the law”(Haley at 
600).    In Gallegos v Colorado (370 U.S. 49 (1962), citing Haley, the five-day interrogation and 
subsequent confession of a 14 year old boy also deprived the suspect of his due process rights. 
93 U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, 1959 
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privacy, but as a matter of racial discrimination and racial justice.94  Accordingly, when 
the Supreme Court decided Mapp v Ohio,95 requiring probable cause to justify police 
searches and excluding evidence obtained under lesser proof, it did more than simply 
extend Fourth Amendment rights to criminal suspects.  The decision placed limits on 
police that re-balanced security and liberties in contexts that disproportionately affected 
minority suspects.96	  
	  
 While Mapp limited the circumstances under which police could search suspects, 
police retained the authority to conduct temporary street stops and investigations whose 
intrusions stopped short of search.  As crime rates increased in the ensuing years, 
primarily in the nation’s urban centers,97 stops and other encounters between minority 
citizens and police became more common and more contentious.98  Many of the riots that 
scarred the inner cities of dozens of American cities from 1964-8 were sparked by anger 
over police abuse of Black citizens.99  The importance of investigative stops in policing 
in that era clashed deepened the tensions surrounding the practice.  	  
	  
 Police and prosecutors pushed back on the Mapp decision, arguing that public 
safety was being harmed by the limitations on police for stops and searches.100  The 
tension that brewed since Mapp nearly boiled over politically in the ensuing years101  In a 
1968 case, the core issues on the limits on police investigative stops were revisited in 
Terry v Ohio,102 where the U.S. Supreme Court relaxed the conditions under which police 
could conduct investigative stops and temporary street detentions.103  The Court, by an 8-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 See, Lewis R. Katz, Mapp After Forty Years: Its Impact on Race in America, 52 Case Western 
Reserve Law Review 471, 483 (2001) ("The Warren Court's due process revolution sought to 
achieve a more level playing field in state criminal proceedings by applying the procedural 
guarantees of the Bill of Rights to state criminal cases. Mapp also sought to achieve justice on the 
streets by imposing the exclusionary rule on state criminal proceedings to discourage police from 
violating Fourth Amendment rights"). 
95 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (excluding evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment limits 
on "unreasonable searches and seizures" from state law criminal prosecutions.) 
96 Yale Kamisar, Mapp v. Ohio: The First Shot Fired in the Warren Court’s Criminal Procedure 
“Revolution,” in (C. Steiker, ed.), Criminal Procedure Stories 45 (2006).  See, Carolyn N. Long, 
Mapp v. Ohio: Guarding Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures (2006) 109. 
97 President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice (1967) 
98 National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (Kerner Commission) (1967) 
99 See Id. See: Jerry Cohen and William Murphy, Burn, Baby, Burn!: The Watts Riot (Dutton, 
1967). 
100 Tracey Meares, Terry and the Relevance of Politics 72 St. John’s L. Rev. 101 (1998). 
101 Rick Perlestein, Nixonland: The Rise of a President and the Fracturing of America (Simon and 
Schuster 2008) (showing how the Richard Nixon campaign exploited fear of crime and racial 
resentment over crime and civil rights to forge an electoral coalition in the 1968 presidential 
election). 
102 Terry v Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) 
103 John Q. Barrett, Terry v Ohio: The Fourth Amendment Reasonableness of Police Stops Based 
on Less Than Probable Cause, in Criminal Procedure Stories 295 (C. Steiker, ed., 2006). 
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1 margin, decided that the police stop of John Terry was reasonable by comparing it to 
activity that would typically require a warrant:	  
	  
“In justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to 
specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from 
those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion.” 104	  
	  
 Terry granted police broad authority to conduct investigative stops when they 
have reasonable and particularized suspicion to believe that crime is imminent, in 
progress, or has just occurred.105 Once a stop began, Terry authorized police to frisk the 
suspect’s person, usually with a pat-down, if the officer feared the suspect is armed or if 
the officer believes that her safety is otherwise at risk. Terry relaxed the standards for 
conducting warrantless searches or seizures to allow these brief street interrogations and 
detentions. Terry also permitted searches of the suspect’s belongings or person if the 
officer formed probable cause that the suspect is carrying contraband or weapons.  The 
Terry Court “agonized”106 over its decision, worrying about an excess of “petty 
indignities” for suspects when police power was used too broadly or aggressively.107 	  
	  
  Terry lowered the probable cause requirement of Mapp, replacing it with a 
standard of reasonable suspicion that “crime is afoot” to justify police intrusions on 
citizens’ freedoms.108  Terry was both a practical and political decision, where the Court 
struggled to balance fairness and efficiency in law enforcement, mindful of the volatile 
social and historical context of the late 1960s.109  The resulting compromise retained the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 Terry v. Ohio, supra 106 at 16, 17. The warrant requirement was the predicate for the 
comparison of McFadden’s stop of Terry to the probable cause standard.  The Court reasoned that 
in a situation where a police obtained a warrant, the facts and inferences that were required of a 
judge or magistrate ot issue a warrant were equivalent to the analysis of the officer who decides 
to exercise the stop power.  The Court required that the facts be not only reasonable but also 
articulable and individualized to the specific situation. These facts and inferences, in turn, would 
facilitate judicial regulation of Terry stops in appellate review. 
105 Terry v. Ohio, supra 106.  Officers could temporarily detain and question a suspect when they 
had reasonable and particularized suspicion to believe that crime was “afoot.”   
106 William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 Yale L.J. 2137, 2152 (2002).  See, 
also, William J. Stuntz, Terry’s Impossibility, 72 St. John’s L. Rev. 1213 (1998); Sherry F. Colb, 
Innocence, Privacy and Targeting in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 
(1996). See, also, Barrett, supra note 102. 
107 The Terry opinion anticipated that stops would be confined to situations where officers had 
reasonable suspicion that there was (a) an ongoing or prospective offense (a crime) that 
threatened violence to persons or property.  See, David Keenan and Tina Thomas, Redefining 
Fourth Amendment Reasonableness: A Crime-Severity Model for Terry Stops, 123 Yale L. J. l 
1118 (2014). 
108 Id.  See, Akhil Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 757 (1994). 
109 See John Q. Barrett, Deciding the Stop and Frisk Cases: A Look Inside the Supreme Court’s 
Conference, 72 St. John’s L. Rev. 749, 839 (1998) (concluding that “[m]any thus think of Terry 
and the law of ‘stop and frisk’ as . . . a sensible balancing of public interests in law enforcement 
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exclusionary rule but granted broader discretion under the Fourth Amendment to police 
officers to decide the circumstances when citizens could be detained and interrogated.110  
Perhaps most important to this article, the racial dimensions of Terry were lost in its 
aftermath, despite its implications for everyday policing in the social and demographic 
parameters of crime in the following decades.111	  
	  
	  
B.  Terry, Race and Law	  
	  
 The issues of race that were minor features of  the original Terry case became 
explicit concerns over the next several decades in the law, politics and policy of 
policing.112 As part of the Violent Crime Control Act of 1994, the Congress included a 
provision that allowed the U.S. Department of Justice to sue local law enforcement 
agencies when it observes a pattern or practice of systemic violations of people’s 
rights.113   Litigation under “14141” beginning in the 1990s identified both Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendment violations in racial profiling, leading to court supervision of both 
state and local police agencies.114  Consent decrees were approved by federal district 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
against relatively lesser intrusions on personal freedom”).  See, also, Michael J. Graetz and Linda 
Greenhouse, Unequal Protections: The Lasting Legacy of Warren Burger’s Supreme Court 
(2016, forthcoming) 
110 Terry, supra note 106.  See, William J. Stuntz, Terry’s Impossibility, 72 St. John’s L. Rev. 
1213, 1213–15, 1217 (1998) (arguing that any attempt to legally regulate street policing is prone 
to error since courts are incapable of systematically accounting for the realities of why police 
engage in certain types of behaviors). 
111 Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74 
NYU L. Rev. 956 (1999) (showing how the jurisprudence and scholarship on Terry in the 
decades since its holding have scrubbed out its racial facts and meaning, leaving behind a race-
neutral account that distorts the realities and demographics of everyday police decision making 
and their exercise of discretion). See, also, Tracey Maclin, Terry v. Ohio's Fourth Amendment 
Legacy: Black Men and Police Discretion, 72 St. John's L. Rev. 1271 (1998).  See, also, Randall 
Kennedy, Race, Crime and Law (Vintage, 1997).  
112 Samuel R. Gross and Debra Livingston, Racial Profiling Under Attack, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 
1431 (2002); R. Richard Banks, Beyond Profiling: Race, Policing and the War on Drugs, 56 
Stanford L. Rev. 571 (2003); Bernard Harcourt, Against Profiling (2007); Kevin R. Johnson, 
Johnson, Racial Profiling After September 11: The Department of Justice's 2003 Guidelines. 25 
Immigr. & Nationality L. Rev. 85 (2004).  See, also, Andrew Taslitz, Racial Blindsight: the 
Absurdity of Color-Blind Criminal Justice, 5 Ohio St. Crim. L. 1 (2007). 
113 The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 14141.  Section 
14141 provides, in part, that:  
[I]t shall be unlawful for any governmental authority, or any agent thereof, or any person acting 
on behalf of a governmental authority, to engage in a pattern or practice of conduct by law 
enforcement officers . . . that deprives persons of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or 
protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States. 
114 See Rachel Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights Through Proactive Policing Reform 62 Stanford 
L. Rev. 1-68 (2009). 
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courts in three jurisdictions in the 1990s,115 imposing obligations on local police 
departments to reform policy and practice to remedy constitutional violations including 
race discrimination in both stops and the use of force.  	  
	  
 The first consent decrees focused on police use of force in Pittsburgh, PA., and 
Stubenville, OH.116 The first consent decree alleging racial profiling was formalized with 
a state police agency in late 1999 in New Jersey, citing constitutional violations in the 
selection of motorists for stops and searches on the New Jersey Turnpike.117  A 1999 
investigation by the New York State Attorney General cited both Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendment violations by the New York City Police Department in its conduct of Terry 
stops under its “stop and frisk” regime.118 In 2001, the Los Angeles Police Department 
finalized a consent decree119 to remedy a pattern of “false arrests, using excessive force, 
conducting stops without reasonable suspicion, and …… improper searches and 
seizures.” 120  Between 2002 and 2013, consent decrees were implemented in 15 cities 
across the country, revealing a set of systemic concerns about both the Fourth 
Amendment core of Terry and the more hidden Fourteenth Amendment prong. 121 	  
	  
 However, after several decades that witnessed the transformation of Terry stops 
from a legal practice to a program and policy, its tensions remain an unfortunate feature 
of urban policing. 122  A less regulated police stop power was exercised increasingly in 
minority communities and with persons of color, or on highways with disproportionate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 Debra Livingston, Police Reform and the Department of Justice: An Essay on Accountability, 
2 Buffalo Crim. L. Rev. 817 (1999); Rachel Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 Michigan L. 
Rev. 761 (2012). See, U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Special Litigation 
Section, Law Enforcement Actions, at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/police.php 
116 See Human Rights Watch, Shielded from Justice: Police Brutality and Accountability in the 
United States 103-05 (1998) (discussing the first wave of consent decrees). 
117 Stipulation of Settlement, United States v. State of New Jersey, Civil No. 99-5970 (D.N.J. 
Dec. 30, 1999), available at http://www.nj.gov/oag/jointapp.htm. 
118 Eliot Spitzer, New York City Police Department's “Stop & Frisk” Practices: A Report to the 
People of the State of New York From the Office of the Attorney General (1999); Andrew 
Gelman, Jeffrey Fagan and Alex Kiss, An Analysis of the New York City Police Department's 
“Stop-and-Frisk” Policy in the Context of Claims of Racial Bias, 107 Journal of the American 
Statistical Association 479 (2007).  Those violations persisted through the Daniels stipulated 
settlement and up to Floyd verdict and order in 2013.  See, Floyd et al. v. City of New York, 
Opinion and Order,  
119 Consent Decree, United States v. Los Angeles, No. 00-11769 GAF (C.D. Cal. June 15, 2001), 
available at http://www.lapdonline.org/assets/pdf/final_consent_decree.pdf 
120 U.S. Department of Justice, Notice of Investigation Letter to the Los Angeles Police 
Department (2000), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/lapdnoti.php 
121 The Department of Justice. http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/police.php 
122 Tracey Meares, Programming Errors supra note 53; Charles Epp, et al., Pulled Over, supra 
note 43; Bernard Harcourt, Against Profiling, supra note 111. 
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stops of non-White motorists.123 Controversies over the racial prong of Terry’s 
“reasonable suspicion” standard arose shortly after Terry in a case where the Supreme 
Court justified the use of Mexican or Latino ethnicity to sanction police stop authority 
near the U.S.-Mexico border.124  That case, in conjunction with U.S. v. Brignoni-
Ponce,125 a case decided a year earlier, are the only U.S. Supreme Court cases to 
specifically sanction the use of race or ethnicity in the decision to stop an individual 
under the Fourth Amendment ru les stated in Terry.  	  
	  
A similar logic of profiling based on race and ethnicity was internalized in the 
early 1980s in drug enforcement training that led to racial disproportionality in highway 
stops.126  In 1996, the U.S. Supreme Court sanctioned pretextual rationales motivating 
automobile stops in Whren v. U.S.127 While not explicitly a rationale for the use of race in 
selective enforcement, the Court refused to consider any factors other than objective 
considerations that animated the officer’s actions.  In other words, having satisfied 
probable cause requirements under the Fourth Amendment, a search motivated by race 
would not pose a constitutional violation.128   Whren effectively separated Fourteenth 
Amendment equal protection considerations from Fourth Amendment protections against 
unreasonable searches,129 a separation that was repaired in Floyd v. City of New York in 
2013.  We discuss this case in more detail infra. 	  
	  
While maintaining its ban on the explicit use of race as an objective factor to 
justify stops, the Supreme Court expanded its analysis of race and policing in Illinois v. 
Wardlow (2000) to permit police stops based in part on robust correlates of race.  The 
Court noted that although an individual’s presence in a “high crime area” does not meet 
the standard for a particularized suspicion of criminal activity, a location's characteristics 
are relevant to determining whether a behavior is sufficiently suspicious to warrant 
further investigation.130  But the Wardlow court offered little guidance to police and 
courts to define a “high crime area,” in terms of its boundaries, crime levels, duration of 
crime, type of crime, or whether the standard varies across cities or parts of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why Driving While Black Matters, 
84 Minn. L. Rev. 265 (1999).   
124 U.S. v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).  
125 U.S. v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975). 
126 David A. Harris, The Stories, supra note 122.  See, Samuel Gross and Debra Livingston, 
Racial Profiling Under Attack, supra note 111. 
127 517 U.S. 806, (1996) (citing Robinson v U.S. 436 U.S. 138, stating that “the fact that the 
officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the 
legal justification for the officer's action does not invalidate the action.”).  
128Kevin R. Johnson, The Story of Whren v. United States: The Song Remains the Same, 435 Race 
and Law Stories (Devon Carbado and Rachel F. Moran, eds. 2006) 
129 See id.  See, Bernard E. Harcourt, United States v. Brignoni-Ponce and United States v. 
Martinez-Fuerte: The Road to Racial Profiling, 315 Criminal Procedure Stories (C. Steiker, ed. 
2006).  
130 Illinois v Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000) 
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country.131  The Wardlow court also left it up to the judgment not just of police officials 
but of the individual officer to determine whether the location where she encountered a 
person whose behavior attracts her gaze meets the definition of “high crime area.” In 
other words, Wardlow created a vague and subjective standard that would be difficult to 
regulate either institutionally or by courts.  Since “high crime areas” and social 
disadvantage often are conflated both perceptually and statistically with concentrations of 
minority citizens,132 this logic places minority neighborhoods at risk for elevating the 
suspiciousness of their residents in the eyes of the police. 	  
	  
C.  Profiling and Discontent	  
	  
By the mid-1990s, almost three decades after Terry, controversies about the 
inflation of what courts validate as suspicion after Terry arose on two fronts.  One source 
of controversy was the use of race as a marker of suspicion leading to police stops on 
highways and streets.  Consent decrees in Maryland, New Jersey and Los Angeles, and a 
Stipulated Settlement in New York City, all were based foundations of empirical 
evidence of racially selective police enforcement.133  Racial profiling became a 
fundamental component of both legal and popular culture. Figure 1 shows that mentions 
in books alone increasing 350% from 1990 to 2008. Its mention in news stories and other 
journalism outlets began with one story in 1987 and exponentially through 2000: 	  
	  
“Only one other use of racial profile showed up before 1990; between 1990 
and the start of 1994, 8 uses; from 1994 until 1996, there were 31 hits; 1996 
until 1998, there were 63; from 1998 until 1999, there were 187; and then an 
enormous spike occurred from 1999 to 2000, over 1000 hits; and from 
January 2000 through October 1, 2000, over 1000 again.”134	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131Andrew Guthrie Ferguson and Damien Bernache. The 'High-Crime Area' Question: Requiring 
Verifiable and Quantifiable Evidence for Fourth Amendment Reasonable Suspicion Analysis. 57 
Am. U. L. Rev. 1587-1644 (2008). 
132 Glenn Loury, The Anatomy of Racial Equality, (Harvard University Press 2002); Douglas 
Massey, Categorically Unequal: The American Stratification System, (Russell Sage Foundation 
2007); Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton, American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of 
the Underclass, (Harvard University Press 1993); Robert J. Sampson, Robert J., and Stephen W. 
Raudenbush, Systematic Social Observation of Public Spaces: A New Look at Disorder in Urban 
Neighborhoods, 105 American Journal of Sociology 622-630 (1999); Robert J. Sampson and 
Stephen W. Raudenbush, Seeing Disorder: Neighborhood Stigma and the Social Construction of 
‘Broken Windows’, 67 Social Psychology Quarterly 319 (2004); Anthony Thompson, Stopping 
the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74 NYU L. Rev. 956 (1999); Jeffrey Fagan, 
Crime and Neighborhood Change Understanding Crime Trends 81 (A. Goldberger and R. 
Rosenfeld, eds 2008.); Geoffrey Alpert, et al., Police Suspicion, supra note 61. 
133 See, for reviews, Bernard Harcourt, Against Prediction; Charles Epp et al, Pulled Over; Harris, 
Statistics; Banks et al, Race and the War on Drugs; Ian Ayres and Jonathan Borowsky; LAPD; 
Jeffrey Fagan and Garth Davies, 2000; Joanna Schwartz, Myths and Mechanics of Deterrence. 
134 Jerome H. Skolnick and Abigail Caplovitz, Guns, Drugs and Profiling: Ways to Target Guns 
and Minimize Racial Profiling, 43 Ariz. L. Rev. 413, 419 and n.6 (2001). 
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Most of these mentions were critical. The term was used to label police practices 
that either animated litigation or were politically contested.  Other mentions simply 
showed the downside risks of profiling for false positives but also greater dignitarian 
harms.135  Rarely were the benefits of profiling mentioned as an aide to law enforcement 
or as contributing to public safety.  More likely, uncritical discussions of racial profiling 
– usually embedded in a larger social and legal context of the war on drugs – saw race-
based selection of individuals for police attention as an unfortunate byproduct or 
necessity of the empirical “realities” of drug-related crime and violence.136  Through all 
the contentious debates, however, no empirical study could identify a statistically sound 
effect of the crime control benefits of profiling.137	  
Profiling controversies also led to political action.  Racial disparities in street and 
highway stops prompted the U.S. Department of Justice to promote best practices for 
police agencies to collect and analyze data on police stops.138  Adoption of these 
measures was less than widespread, and data were collected in some places only under 
the pressures of pending or threatened litigation.139  Across the U.S., 17 states developed 
and implemented systems for collecting and reporting vehicle and street stop activity.  In 
some instances, the rapid expansion of data collection mechanisms resulted in research 
scholarship that allowed for testing of criminological theories of policing, race and social 
contexts.140  The resulting research was extensive, and spanned the range of social 
science disciplines while raising contentious normative and philosophical debates. 	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 See, e.g., Nedra Pickler, Judge Robert Wilkins, Obama Nominee, Successfully Sued Md. State 
Police For Racial Profiling, Huffington Post, August 2013, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/04/judge-robert-wilkins_n_3386013.html (describing 
the 1992 highway stop of Federal District Court Judge Robert Wilkins where Maryland State 
Troopers forced him to stand outside his vehicle in the rain while waiting for a canine unit to 
show up to conduct a search of his automobile. Wilkins, a public defender at the time, was 
returning from an all-night journey home following his grandfather’s funeral.  Wilkins missed a 
court date the following morning due to his detention on the highway.) 
136 See, e.g., William Stuntz, Race, Class and Drugs, 98 Columbia L. Rev. 1795 (1999).   See, 
also, Skolnick and Caplovitz, id., for a more detailed accounting of the racial prong of street and 
highway stops. 
137 Michael Tonry, Punishing Race: A Continuing American Dilemma (Oxford University Press, 
2011). 
138 Deborah Ramirez, et al., A Resource Guide on Racial Profiling Data Collection Systems: 
Promising Practices and Lessons Learned Northeastern University of Law Research Paper, 
(2012); See also, http://www.nij.gov/topics/law-enforcement/legitimacy/pages/traffic-stops.aspx 
139 See, Illinois v Chavez litigation.  Data collection in New York City on its controversial stops 
and frisk program began under political pressure from the 1999 investigation by the New York 
State Attorney General following the police killing of Amadou Diallo is a botched stop. See, Eliot 
Spitzer, New York City Police Department's “Stop & Frisk” Practices: A Report to the People of 
the State of New York From the Office of the Attorney General (1999) 
140 See, e.g., Fagan and Davies; Rojek, Rosenfeld and Decker, Policing Race: The Racial 
Stratification of Searches in Police Traffic Stops, 50 Criminology 993 (2012); Katherine Y. 
Barnes, Assessing the Counterfactual: The Efficacy of Drug Interdiction Absent Racial Profiling, 
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The second controversy was generated by an instrumental analysis of profiling as 
a tradeoff of harms that leads to a moral imperative to create wide space for police to act 
on race-based signals of suspicion. Proponents of race-based selection of suspects, or 
racially disproportionate selection, based their preferences on three prongs: (a) higher 
crime rates among African American and Latino people (or in places where they are 
demographically concentrated, (b) the greater efficiency and effectiveness of police 
methods that apply race-based strategies, and (c) the moral imperative to pursue tactics 
that maximize social welfare and security.  To ignore race in the design of police tactics 
would be to risk greater exposure of individuals, including those in the affected groups, to 
unjustified harms.141 The arguments for profiling assume that the social good produced 
by welfare outweighs the harms of the inequalities inherent in race-based selection of 
persons.142 	  
	  
The arguments advancing profiling ran headlong into its constitutional 
weaknesses, even under a newly capacious Fourth Amendment suspicion standard that 
invited the substitution of race-based correlates of suspicion for explicit racial 
categories.143  The inherent constitutional violations deflated the moral arguments, as did 
the dubious claim of its effectiveness.  But other critiques emerged that also pushed back 
on profiling.  Beyond the failure of proponents to find empirical support for the claim of 
its benefits, the utilitarian view tended to discount the serious harms to the innocent who 
are stopped, particularly innocent African Americans who bore the brunt of police 
actions.144 	  
	  
Recognition of those harms was inherent in the Terry decision itself, which 
acknowledged that police stops, especially for the innocent, amounted to more than a 
“petty indignity.”145  The harms of Terry stops are several: the stigma harm of being 
singled out when innocent, the shaming of being singled out by the police and physically 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Duke L. J. 1089 (2005).  See, e.g., Stephen K. Rice and Michael White (eds.), Race, Ethnicity 
and Policing: New and Essential Readings (2010).   
141 Mathias Risse and Richard Zeckhauser, Racial Profiling, 32 Philosophy & Public Affairs 131 
(2004). 
142 A similar argument was made by Sunstein and Vermeule on capital punishment.  They argued 
that if the death penalty was an effective deterrent to murder, then the life-life tradeoff of capital 
punishment created a more imperative to execute those convicted of capital murder, and a moral 
offense when executions are not carried out in the face of evidence of deterrence and the 
possibility of lives lost.  Cass Sunstein and Adrien Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally 
Required? 58 Stanford L. Rev. 703 (2005). 
143 See, Whren and Wardlow discussions, supra. 
144 Steven N. Durlauf, Assessing Racial Profiling, 116 The Economic Journal F401 (2006) 
(arguing that a Fairness Presumption would negate arguments for using race-based police stops as 
a public policy and practice). 
145 “Moreover, it is simply fantastic to urge that such a procedure performed in public by a 
policeman while the citizen stands helpless, perhaps facing a wall with his hands raised, is a 
"petty indignity." It is a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict great 
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interrogated in front of one’s family and neighbors, the racial stigma that attaches when 
minorities are disproportionately targeted for stops, and the potential for physical 
violence when stops arouse anger or when police use aggressiveness when confronted by 
their own safety fears.146 Stops can be verbally harsh, physically aggressive, or laced with 
racial or sexual invectives trigger a variety of emotional reactions.   Accordingly, a robust 
and consistent stream of research reveals numerous harms that people of color experience 
as a result of accumulated, proactive police contacts.  Survey research in New York City 
under its stop and frisk program showed elevated rates of symptoms of post-traumatic 
stress disorder among the young adults most often stopped and most intrusively 
policed.147  	  
	  
D.  Two Visions of Neighborhood and Police	  
At the same time that the clashes between minorities and police have occupied 
center stage, a different form of equal protection complaints remained generally unheard 
and have only recently been taken seriously.  Minority citizen concerns about the 
everyday under-policing of distressed neighborhoods also have received less scholarly 
attention.148 Nonetheless, police executives have increasingly come to understand that 
disadvantaged, high-crime minority communities may indeed simultaneously experience 
under- and over-policing.  Professor Randall Kennedy notes that “in terms of misery 
inflicted by direct criminal violence, blacks (and other people of color) suffer more from 
the criminal acts of their racial ‘brothers’ and ‘sisters’ than they do from the racist 
misconduct of white police officers.”149  Given that both under- and over-policing have 
been shown to seriously undermine public confidence in and trust of the police, policy 
makers face a weighty challenge concerning how best to deliver effective crime control 
strategies without engaging in potentially racially discriminatory policing practices.	  
Further, police leaders’ allocation and prioritization of resources may unwittingly 
result in strategies that have the potential to exacerbate longstanding tensions between 
police and members of minority communities.  Specifically, police departments seldom 
have strong relationships with residents of distressed, black neighborhoods, places where 
violent crime is also disproportionately concentrated.  In fact, blacks consistently report 
being more distrustful of and having less confidence in the police than their counterparts 
from other racial groups.  Black citizens’ persistent negative attitudes toward the police 
have important implications for contemporary crime-control efforts.  Simply put, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 Stuntz, Terry’s Impossibility, supra note 110.  See, also, Bernard E. Harcourt, Rethinking 
Racial Profiling: A Critique of the Economics, Civil Liberties, and Constitutional Literature, and 
of Criminal Profiling More Generally, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1275, 1292 (2004); Sherry F. Colb, 
Innocence, Privacy, and Targeting in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 1456 
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147 Amanda Geller, et al., Aggressive Policing and the Mental Health of Young Urban Men, 104 
American Journal of Public Health 2321 (2014). 
148 Randall Kennedy, Race, Crime, and the Law (Vintage Books 1998) 
149 Id. at 20. 
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individuals’ are more inclined to support and assist police in their overall crime-fighting 
mission if they view the police (and their routine tactics) favorably.	  
Nearly a century of legal and social trends set the stage for the current debate on 
race and policing.  Historically, close surveillance by police has been a part of everyday 
life for African Americans and other minority groups.150  In recent decades, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has sanctioned border interdictions of persons of Mexican or Hispanic 
ethnicity to halt illegal immigration,151 as well as the racial components of drug courier 
profiling by airlines.152  The U.S. Supreme Court has also allowed the use of race as a 
basis for a police stop as long as there were other factors that motivated the stop,153 and a 
federal district court permitted the use of race as a search criterion if there was an explicit 
racial description of the suspect.154  	  
The legal standard to regulate the constitutionality of police conduct in citizen 
stops derives from Terry v. Ohio (1968), which involved a pedestrian stop that 
established the parameters of the “reasonable suspicion” standard for police conduct in 
detaining citizens for purposes of search or arrest.155  Recently, the courts have expanded 
the concept of` “reasonable suspicion” to include location as well as the individual's 
behavior. In fact, the Court has articulated and refined this “high crime area” doctrine in 
subsequent cases.156 This line of cases allows police to consider the character of a 
neighborhood as a factor justifying a standard lower than the constitutionally-defined 
threshold in individualized “reasonable” suspicion articulated in Terry v Ohio (1968).157  	  
But in connecting race and policing, the Court was only formalizing what 
criminologists had known for decades.  Early studies on police selection of citizens for 
stops suggested that both the racial characteristics of the suspect and the racial 
composition of the suspect's neighborhood influence police decisions to stop, search, or 
arrest a suspect.158 Particularly in urban areas, suspect race interacts with neighborhood 
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characteristics to animate the formation of suspicion among police officers.159  For 
example, Alpert and his colleagues showed that police are more likely to view a minority 
citizen as suspicious–leading to a police stop–based on non-behavioral cues while relying 
on behavioral cues to develop suspicion for white citizens.160 	  
Individuals – including police and political leaders – also may substitute racial 
characteristics of communities for racial characteristics of individuals in their cognitive 
schema of suspicion, and, more important, act on them. Urban residents’ perceptions of 
crime in their neighborhoods are significantly predicted by the prevalence of young black 
men, even after crime levels and other neighborhood characteristics are controlled for.161  
Police perceptions may be similarly skewed, resulting in elevated stop rates in 
neighborhoods with high concentrations of minority populations, and the pathway is 
through the translation of perceptions into neighborhood stigma. For example, in a study 
of police practices in three cities, suspects in poor neighborhoods were more likely to be 
arrested, after controlling for suspect behavior and the type of crime.162 Suspects’ race 
and racial composition of the suspect's neighborhood were also significant predictors of 
police response.  It seems that social psychological mechanisms interact with cultural 
processes (patterns of behavior) and structural features of neighborhoods (poverty, 
concentrations of minority citizens) to produce perceptions of disorder that perpetuate 
urban inequality163 through several forms of discrimination, including policing intensity 
and tactics.164 Fagan and Davies showed that street stops in New York were predicted not 
by disorder but by race and poverty, despite policing theories that emphasized disorder as 
a pathway to elevated crime.165 Poor neighborhoods are stigmatized in this way, and 
people both within these areas as well as those who reside elsewhere – including those 
with administrative authority to withhold or allocate various services – are likely to act on 
their perceptions.	  
Alternatively, these coercive police responses may relate to the perception that 
poor neighborhoods may have limited capacity for social control and self-regulation. This 
strategy was formalized in the influential “broken windows” essay of James Q. Wilson 
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and George L. Kelling.166 They argued that police responses to disorder were critical to 
communicate intolerance for crime and to halt its contagious spread.  Broken windows 
called for the targeting of police resources to neighborhoods where public order was 
deteriorating, with the expectation that stopping disorderly behavior would stem the 
“developmental sequence” to more serious crime.  In the original essay, Wilson and 
Kelling worried about “criminal invasion” of disorderly neighborhoods.167  
Neighborhood disorder has explicitly been used as a criterion for allocating police 
resources in New York City since 1994, when Commissioner William Bratton set 
policies to focus on minor offenses such as subway fare evasion and aggressive 
panhandling, in addition to felonies and other serious crime.168 The policy also called for 
aggressive responses to social disorder that was endogenous to neighborhoods, in contrast 
to the “criminal invasion” concern in the theory’s pristine form.	  
This order-maintenance approach also has been disputed, however, as critics 
question the causal link between disorder and more serious crime.169  Despite the 
potential endogeneity of race and both social and physical disorder,170 several of these 
studies suggest that a focus on disorder might have a disparate impact on citizens of 
different races.  For example, residents’ perceptions of disorder in Chicago 
neighborhoods conflate systematically observable conditions with their neighborhoods’ 
racial and socioeconomic makeup.171  The association between race, poverty, and 
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perceived disorder is significant in residents of all racial and ethnic backgrounds; race 
and concentrated poverty predict both local residents’ and outsiders’ perceptions of 
disorder even more strongly than does systematically observed disorder.  And the effect 
grows stronger as the concentration of poverty and minority groups increase.  	  
	  
E. Is It Bias Revisited: Approaches to Studying Police Stops and Searches	  
	  
 Recent empirical evidence on police stops supports perceptions among minority 
citizens that police disproportionately stop African American and Hispanic motorists, and 
that once stopped, these citizens are more likely to be searched or arrested.172 For 
example, surveys with nationwide probability samples, completed in 1999, 2002, and 
2008 showed that African-Americans were far more likely than other Americans to report 
being stopped on the highways by police.173  Each survey showed that minority drivers 
also were more likely to report being arrested, handcuffed, or searched by police, and that 
they more often were threatened with force or had force used against them.  These 
disparities in stop rates exact high social costs that animate culturally meaningful forms 
of stigma that reinforce racial inequalities, especially in the practice of law 
enforcement.174 These stigmas often translate into withdrawal of minority populations 
from cooperation with the police and other legal authorities in the co-production of 
security.175	  
Traffic violations often serve as the rationale or pretext for stops of motorists,176 
just as “suspicious behavior” is the spark for both pedestrian and traffic stops.177 As with 
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traffic violations, the range of suspicious behaviors is broad enough to challenge efforts 
to identify an appropriate baseline to which to compare race-specific stop rates.178 
Pedestrian stops are at the very core of policing, used to enforce narcotics and weapons 
laws, to identify fugitives or other persons for whom warrants may be outstanding, to 
investigate reported crimes and “suspicious” behavior, and to improve community quality 
of life. Indeed, because low-level “quality of life” and misdemeanor offenses are more 
likely to be committed in the open, the “reasonable suspicion” standard is more easily 
satisfied in these sorts of crimes.179	  
Two distinct approaches characterize recent efforts to model and understand racial 
disparities in police stops.  Each focuses less on identifying racial bias than on 
understanding the role of race in explaining patterns of police behavior.  Attributing bias 
is difficult: causal claims about discrimination would require far more information than 
the typical administrative (observational) datasets can supply.  For example, when 
Officer McFadden stopped suspect Terry in the events leading to the landmark 1968 U.S. 
Supreme Court decision in Terry v Ohio, he used his law enforcement “experience” to 
interpret Terry’s behavior in front of the jewelry store. The multiplicity of interacting 
factors complicated the identification of the role of race in the decision to detain Terry,180 
but several analyses of the facts and jurisprudence of Terry suggest that the Supreme 
Court opinion discounted the influence of race in the opinion.181 	  
In Terry, it would difficult to identify race alone, apart from the context in which 
race was observed, as the factor that animated McFadden’s decision to stop and frisk 
suspect Terry.  Instead, reliable evidence of ethnic or racial bias in these instances would 
require experimental designs that control for these competing and interacting factors – 
situational context, demeanor of suspect – so as to isolate differences in outcomes that 
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could only be attributed to race or ethnicity.  Such experiments are routinely used in tests 
of discrimination in housing and employment.182  But observational studies that lack such 
controls are often embarrassed by omitted variable biases: few studies can control for all 
the variables that police consider in deciding whether to stop or search someone, much 
less their several combinations or permutations.  Research in situ that relies on direct 
observation of police behavior183 requires officers to articulate the reasons for their 
actions, a task that is vulnerable to numerous validity threats. Sampling considerations, as 
well as the presence of researchers in the context of the decision, also challenge the 
validity of observational studies.  	  
The first approach to studying racial disparities bypasses the question of whether 
police intend to discriminate on the basis of ethnicity or race, and instead focuses on 
disparate impacts of police stop strategies.  This strategy is prevalent in studies of 
decisions in the context of highways stops.  In this approach, comparisons of “hit rates”, 
or efficiencies in the proportion of stops that yield positive results, serve as evidence of 
disparate impacts of police stops. This type of analysis has been used in several 
studies,184 and many other studies of police behaviors on highways.185 This approach 
bypasses the supply-side question of who is stopped (and for what reason), and instead 
looks only at disparate impacts or outcomes for different groups. 	  
Outcome tests are agnostic with respect to race-based motivations for stops or 
frisks versus a search for efficiency and deterrence.186  They can show when a particular 
policy or decision-making outcome has a disparate impact whose racial disproportionality 
is not justified by heightened institutional productivity, negating an efficiency 
rationale.  In the context of profiling, outcome tests assume that the ex post probability 
that a police search will uncover drugs or other contraband is a function of the degree of 
probable cause that police use in deciding to stop and search a suspect.187  If searches of 
minorities are less productive than searches of whites, this could be evidence that police 
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have a lower threshold of probable cause when searching minorities.  At the very least, it 
is a sign of differential treatment of minorities that in turn produces a disparate impact. 	  
Knowles, Persico, and Todd consider this “hit rate” approach theoretically as well 
as empirically in a study finding that, of the drivers on Interstate 95 in Maryland stopped 
by police on suspicion of drug trafficking, African Americans were as likely as whites to 
have drugs in their cars.188  Their theoretical analysis posits a dynamic process that 
considers the behaviors of police and citizens of different races, and integrates their 
decisions in equilibrium where police calibrate their behavior to the probabilities of 
detecting illegal behavior, and citizens in different racial groups adjust their propensities 
to accommodate the likelihood of detection.  They concluded that the search for drugs 
was an efficient allocation of police resources, despite the disparate impacts of these 
stops on minority citizens.189  	  
Outcome tests can be constructed as quasi-experiments, with race as a treatment, 
to identify the role of race in the selection of citizens for searches.  Ridgeway matched 
suspects within officers to compare the post-stop outcomes of white suspects to those of 
minority suspects in similar locations, stopped at similar times and for the same 
reasons.190  He reports no differences in post-stop arrests (“hit rates”) despite the greater 
number of stops of non-whites. But this approach seeks to explain away contextual 
variables, especially neighborhood context, rather than explicitly incorporate these 
factors in an identification strategy.  Close and Mason construct a disparate outcome 
quasi-experiment to identify the role of race in police searches by comparing the 
preferences of officers of different races to search motorists, controlling for the motorist’s 
race.191  They use both an outcomes-based non-parametric (quasi-experimental) analysis 
and a standard benchmarking parametric (regression) approach, and report both personal 
biases and police cultural bias in their propensity to search African American and Latino 
drivers.	  
These are useful but limited strategies.  The robustness of these designs is 
compromised, by the omission of several factors – some unobservable and others usually 
absent from administrative data – that might bias their claims, such as racial differences 
in the attributes that police consider when deciding which motorists or pedestrians to 
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stop, search or arrest,192 or differences in police behavior in neighborhoods or other social 
contexts with different racial makeup.193 The omission of neighborhood context also 
biases estimates of the proportionality of police stops of citizens.  The randomizing 
equilibrium assumptions in the Knowles et al. approach – that both police and potential 
offenders adjust their behavior in response to the joint probabilities of carrying 
contraband and being stopped – tend to average across broad heterogeneous conditions 
both in police decision making and offenders' propensities to crime,194 and discount the 
effects of race-specific sensitivities toward crime decisions under varying conditions of 
detection risk via police stop.195  When these two concerns are addressed, Dharmapala 
and Ross identify different types of equilibria that lead to different conclusions about 
racial prejudice in police stops and searches.196	  
Accordingly, the nature and extent of racial bias in the policing of motorists and 
pedestrians remains unsettled empirically.197  Supply-side issues, both in the number and 
characteristics of the persons available for stops by virtue of law violation or even 
suspicious behavior, complicate the search game paradigm by skewing the population of 
stopped drivers according to the ex ante probabilities of criminality that police officers 
assign to different racial groups.  Institutional or individual differences in the goals of law 
enforcement may also create heterogeneity both in the selection of individuals to be 
stopped and the decisions to engage them in searches for drugs, weapons, or other 
contraband.  Officers may pursue one set of law enforcement goals for one group – 
maximizing arrests – while pursuing a different set of goals – minimizing crime – for 
another.  Racial nepotism or antagonism may lead to differences in police stop and search 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
192 See, e.g., Alpert et al. (2005); Smith, Michael R., M. Makarios, and Geoffrey P. Alpert (2006), 
“Differential Suspicion: Theory Specification and Gender Effects in the Traffic Stop Context,” 
Justice Quarterly, 23, 271-295. 
193 Smith, 1986; Fagan and Davies 2000; Alpert et al., 2005 
194 Durlauf (2006); Dharmapala, D. and S. L. Ross (2004), “Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle 
Searches: Additional Theory and Evidence,” Contributions to Economic Policy and Analysis 3, 
article 12; available at www.bepress.com/bejeap/contributions/vol13/iss1/art12 (Accessed August 
1, 2014). 
195 Alpert et al., Police Suspicion and Discretionary Decision Making during Citizen Stops, 43(2), 
Criminology 407-434 (2005); Jeff Dominitz and John Knowles, Crime Minimisation and Racial 
Bias: What Can We Learn From Police Search Data? 116.515 The Economic Journal F368-F384 
(2006). 
196 Dhammika Dharmapala and Stephen L. Ross, Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle Searches: 
Additional Theory and Evidence, 3(1) Contributions in Economic Analysis and Policy (2004). 
197 Billy R. Close and Patrick Leon Mason, Searching for Efficient Enforcement: Officer 
Characteristics and Racially Biased Policing, 3(2) Review of Law and Economics 263-321 
(2007); Persico, Nicola and Petra Todd. (2005). “Passenger Profiling, Imperfect Screening, and 
Airport Security”. American Economic Association Papers and Proceedings.: 127-31; Kate 
Antonovics and Brian G. Knight (2009). “A New Look at Racial Profiling: Evidence from the 
Boston Police Department.” Review of Economics and Statistics, 91(1): 163–177; Donohue, John, 
and Steven Levitt (2001).  “The Impact of Race on Policing, Arrest Patterns and Crime,” Journal 
of Law and Economics 44(2): 367-94; David Bjerk, “Racial Profiling, Statistical Discrimination, 
and the Effect of a Colorblind Policy on the Crime Rate,” Journal of Public Economic Theory 
9(3): 543-567 (2007). 
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behaviors when officers of one race face choices as to stop or search a driver of the same 
or a different racial or ethnic group.198	  
These complexities illustrate the difficulty of identifying the role of race in 
producing racial disparities in stops and searches, and suggest a second approach that 
incorporates the contexts in which individual officers consider race in their everyday 
interactions with citizens.  Gelman et al. and Alpert et al show how neighborhood context 
influences both the attribution of suspicion that animates an encounter and the outcomes 
of police-citizen encounters.199  The institutional context of policing also may influence 
individual officers’ decisions through stigmatizing neighborhoods as “high crime” or 
disorderly, skewing how officers perceive and interpret the actions of citizens.  
Institutional cultures also may implicitly tolerate such perceptual or cognitive schema and 
internalize them into policy preferences and strategic decisions, as well as internal 
preferences for reward, promotion or discipline. 	  
These contextual concerns, informed by crime plus social and demographic 
dimensions of neighborhoods, suggest the second approach, one that explicitly 
incorporates either a multilevel approach that examines officer-place interactions, or 
shifts the focus from the actions of individual officers and individual suspects to the 
behaviors of cohorts of officers who collectively patrol neighborhoods with measurable 
attributes that incorporate race and ethnicity, and where aggregation biases from racial 
concentration may shape officers’ Bayesian priors about crime and thresholds of 
suspicion.	  
	  
	  
III.  FIELD INTERROGATION AND OBSERVATIONS BY THE POLICE IN BOSTON	  
	  
A. Observing the Observed and the Observers	  
 Boston, Massachusetts, is the site for this research.  The FIO strategy in Boston 
encompasses street encounters of the sort envisioned in Terry, where officers temporarily 
detain and question persons for whom they have reasonable and articulable suspicion that 
“crime is afoot.”200  This regime also includes non-contact observations, which we 
discussed earlier.201 	  
Worries about the panopticonistic approach range from anxiety about privacy and 
anonymity of individuals in their everyday movements, to anxiety about easy detection of 
and over-enforcement of low-stakes crimes, to the racial disparities that may be inherent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198 Billy R. Close and Patrick Leon Mason, Searching for Efficient Enforcement: Officer 
Characteristics and Racially Biased Policing (2007). 
199 Gelman, Andrew, Jeffrey Fagan, and Alex Kiss An Analysis of the New York City Police 
Department’s ‘Stop-and-Frisk’ Policy in the Context of Claims of Racial Bias. 102 Journal of the 
American Statistical Association 813-823 (2007); Alpert et al. (2005). 
200 Terry at 30-31. 
201 See, discussion in Section I.D and accompany notes. 
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in such regimes.202 But one advantage of this approach is that it can accommodate 
transparency, as these analyses show.  When police scan for suspicious behavior, we have 
only vague ideas about how their discretion is managed, and even more vague ideas 
about what exactly it is that they are looking for.203  	  
While there may be nothing like an algorithm to explain how observations are 
formed, there at least are observable patterns.  The worry in this regime is about race: 
unconscious patterns that shape the formation of suspicion based on archetypes such as 
the “symbolic assailant” and other processes that shape cognition and interpretation of 
behavioral cues.  Transparency at least provides a window to observe what those 
processes produce. In other words, it lets observers, assuming access to these records, 
observe the observers as they conduct surveillance.	  
What remains unknown in this process is the harms that may accrue from these 
routine invasions of privacy.204 The dignitarian concerns pose one type of harm: the fact 
that one is a target of surveillance signals to other observers and perhaps to the watching 
public the person is a potential threat.  That alone can have stigmatizing consequences 
throughout the community of the observed.205 Apart from the dignity worries, conducting 
these observations and stops can have negative effects on the way that police regard 
citizens and respect their autonomy and privacy.206	  
	  
B.  The Boston FIO Regime	  
In this study, we analyzed data provided by the BPD on its FIO activity.  The 
BPD Boston Regional Intelligence Center (BRIC) maintains an electronic database of 
FIO reports.  These forms are used to document BPD officer interactions with individuals 
suspected of criminal activity, or associates of those individuals, including direct 
encounters and non-contact observations.207 FIO reports are a central activity in the 
BPD’s intelligence efforts to collect and analyze data on the activities and whereabouts of 
known and suspected criminals and their associates in Boston. The reports document the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
202 Daniel Solove, Nothing to Hide: The False Tradeoff between Privacy and Security (Yale 
University Press 2011); I. Bennett Capers, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment: Race, Citizenship, 
and the Equality Principle, 46 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 10-15 (2010): 
203 William H. Simon, In Defense of the Panopticon, Boston Review, September-October 214. 
204 Stuntz, Fourth Amendment and Privacy, supra note 94. 
205 See, e.g., Jane Bambauer, Hassle 113 Mich. L. Review 461-585 (2015) (noting that when 
police conduct stops, the community watching those stops internalizes the stigma attached to the 
person who has been stopped.  When no wrongdoing is found, the stigma may remain.  See, also, 
Amanda B. Geller et al., Aggressive Policing and the Mental Health of Young Urban Men, 104 
(12) Amer. J. Pub. Health 2321-2327 (2014). There is no reason to believe that when police 
conduct such observations, a stigma signal may be produced even in the absence of any contact. 
206 David Sklansky, Too Much Information: How Not to Think About Privacy and the Fourth 
Amendment, Cal. L. Rev.  (Forthcoming, 2014). 
207 Boston Police Department Rules and Procedures. Rule 323, Field Interrogation, Observation, 
Frisk, and/or Search Reports. May 25, 2005, Page 1. 
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name, date-of-birth, sex, and race of FIO subjects as well as the date, time, and location 
of interaction.  	  
Our analysis focuses on the period from 2007 through 2010.  During that time, 
BPD officers made N=204,739 FIO reports. Compared to the residential population, the 
targets of FIO reports were disproportionately male, young, and Black. For these 204,739 
FIO reports, the subjects were 89.0 percent male, 54.7 percent ages 24 or younger, and 
63.3 percent Black. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, in 2010, Boston had some 
617,594 residents that were 47.9 percent male, 36.2 percent ages 24 or younger, and 25.1 
percent black.208 	  
At first glance, these differences are suggestive of racially disparate treatment in 
BPD FIO activity.  However, these differences could also reflect crime risk differences in 
Boston’s neighborhoods and population groups. Criminological research has long 
documented that criminal offenders are more likely to be young and male.209 Violent 
crime problems also tend to concentrate in highly disadvantaged urban neighborhoods 
that are disproportionately populated by black residents.210	  
BPD officers are required to document the reason for the completion of each FIO 
report and required to note whether they conducted Terry frisks for officer safety 
purposes and/or searches for the purposes of seizing evidence. Some 40.5 percent of the 
FIO reports involve a frisk and/or search of the subject (82,919).211 Officers have very 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
208 http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk 
(Accessed March 14, 2015). 
209 David Farrington, Age and Crime 7 Crime & Justice 189 (1986). Jeffery T. Ulmer, and John 
H. Kramer, The Interaction of Race, Gender, and Age in Criminal Sentencing: The Punishment 
Costs of Being Young, Black, and Male, 36 Criminology 763-797 (1998). 
210 Lauren J., Krivo, Ruth D. Peterson, and Danielle C. Kuhl, Segregation, Racial Structure, and 
Neighborhood Violent Crime, 114 American Journal of Sociology 1765-1802 (2009).  
Unfortunately, due to a long history of exclusion from economic and social opportunities, 
residents of disadvantaged urban neighborhoods are primarily minorities and often black.  
Research has documented that most violence occurs within racial groups and that black 
Americans, often victimized by black offenders, experience disproportionately high levels of 
violent crime. Empirical evidence suggests that the capacity of neighborhood residents to achieve 
a common set of goals and exert control over youth and public spaces, termed “collective 
efficacy,” is a protective factor against serious violence (Sampson et al., 1997).  The presence of 
community-based organizations, which draw membership from individuals from within and 
outside specific neighborhoods, predict collective efficacy and collective civic action (Sampson, 
2012).  Concentrated disadvantage in urban neighborhoods, which are often populated by black 
residents, undermines local collective efficacy and gravely limits the ability of residents to 
address serious violent crime problems (Sampson and Wilson, 1985).   
211 38.6% of the FIO reports indicated that the subjects were frisked and 11.6% of the FIO reports 
indicated that the subjects were searched.  All but 1.8% of the searches were reported in 
conjunction with a frisk of the subject.  Moreover, descriptive statistical analyses revealed that the 
biggest differences between FIO type and subject race arose when the FIO involved a frisk and/or 
search relative to a more simple observation and/or interrogation. Some 29.5% percent of White 
subjects were frisked / searched during an FIO relative to the 45.4% percent of Black subjects, 
40.5% of Hispanic subjects, and 35.6% of Asian /other race subjects. As such, FIO type was 
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limited space on the form to record their reasons for the FIO and, unfortunately, 75.0 
percent (153,554) of the FIO reports simply state “investigation person” as the 
justification. This lack of documentation of stop rationales prevents a Fourth Amendment 
analysis of the legal justifications for discretionary stops and searches of FIO subjects. 
Also, there is no information on the outcomes of the FIO events about whether the frisks 
and searches led to arrests, summons, or seizure of weapons or contraband.  In fact, FIO 
events that did lead to either of those outcomes are not recorded.  Officers default to the 
completion of an arrest report in those circumstances.  In turn, the type of outcome 
analysis that was essential to resolving the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims in 
the Floyd stop-and-frisk litigation in New York could not be completed here.  	  
	  
	  
C. Empirical Strategy	  
	  
Our empirical strategy combines two distinct approaches to estimate racial 
disparities. The first strategy is a disparate treatment strategy that examines stops in 
alternate empirical specifications looking at first aggregates – neighborhoods or police 
districts – and then individuals nested within those districts.  We drew upon regression 
models developed by Fagan and colleagues212 to investigate alleged violations of the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution by the New York City Police 
Department (NYPD) in their stop, question, and frisk (SQF) practices as part of the David 
Floyd et al. v. City of New York et al. U.S. District Court complaint.213  Their analyses 
examined whether the racial composition of NYPD precinct residents predicted stop 
patterns after controlling for the influences of crime, social conditions, and the allocation 
of police resources. Here, we adapted their analytical framework to examine whether the 
racial composition of Boston neighborhoods predicts BPD FIO patterns, adjusting for 
crime, social and economic predictors, and police resources.	  
 The second strategy exploits the availability of data on officer race to determine 
whether the observed differences in stop rates for White and non-white youths are a 
function of preference-based discrimination, or statistical discrimination.  Statistical 
discrimination would reflect a tendency to stop one group at a higher rate than another 
based on observable characteristics such as known crime rates.  But preference-based 
discrimination would reflect a tendency to prefer one group for stops over others based 
on factors unrelated to their observable differences in the targeted behavior.  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
collapsed into two categories: 0 = No Search (Observed and/or Interrogated only) and 1 = Frisk 
and/or Search Conducted. 
212 Report of Jeffrey Fagan, Ph.D. (2010) for David Floyd et al. v. City of New York et al., U.S. 
District Court for the Southern District of New York, 08 Civ. 01034 (SAS), October 28; Andrew 
Gelman, Jeffrey Fagan and Alex Kiss, An Analysis of the NYPD's Stop-and-Frisk Policy in the 
Context of Claims of Racial Bias, 102 Journal of the American Statistical Association 813-823 
(2007). 
213 Second Amended Complaint, David Floyd et al. v. City of New York et al., U.S. District Court 
for the Southern District of New York, 08 Civ. 01034 (SAS), October 28.  
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A study by Professors Antonovics and Knight (hereafter, AK) conducted this type 
of analysis in Boston based on traffic stops by the BPD.  AK extended the Knowles, 
Persico and Todd (KPT)214 hit rate (or equilibrium) test to test for bias in traffic stops by 
Boston police officers from 2001-3.215  Following the KPT equilibrium model, AK 
assume that officers will rationally stop motorists according to their beliefs about the 
comparative propensities to violate the law by carrying contraband – drugs or weapons.  
If population groups understand the risks of violating the law, they will adjust their 
behaviors accordingly and their propensities should fall into equilibrium with other 
groups and with officers’ preferences. In a statistical model, differences in “hit rates” 
between groups should be negligible, a sign that equilibrium has been reached.216This 
form of statistical discrimination stands in contrast to preference based discrimination, 
where police will stop motorists based on preferences to detain or arrest citizens in a 
particular racial group independent from their assumptions about that group’s propensity 
to carry contraband. 	  
In this case, AK were able to observe the race of both the officer and the suspect 
and estimate the magnitude of preference-based discrimination.  AK used officer race-
suspect race dyads as a benchmark for discrimination, assuming that officers would be 
more likely to stop and search a suspect from a different racial group.  Perhaps officers 
believe they are better able to detect signals of wrongdoing among persons within their 
own race, or same-group membership may lead to preferential treatment.  Regardless of 
motive, evidence of higher rates of cross-race differences in search rates would suggest 
preference-based discrimination rather than simply statistical discrimination based on 
general beliefs about crime-propensity within each racial or ethnic group. Other studies 
have used the same strategy in different settings to reach the same conclusions.217  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
214 John Knowles, Nicola Persico and Petra Todd, Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle Searches: Theory 
and Evidence, 109 Journal of Political Economy 203 (2001). See, also, Nicola Persico and Petra 
Todd, Using Hit Rate Tests to Test for Racial Bias in Law Enforcement: Vehicle Searches in 
Wichita, 515 Economic Journal 351 (2006).  For a critique of the KPT equilibrium model, see 
David Bjerk, Racial Profiling, Statistical Discrimination, and the Effect of a Colorblind Policy on 
the Crime Rate, 9 Journal of Public Economic Theory 543 (2007). 
215 Kate Antonovics and Brian G. Knight, A New Look at Racial Profiling: Evidence from the 
Boston Police Department, 91 The Review of Economics and Statistics, 163–177 (2009). 
216 Knowles, Persico and Todd, supra note 218.  But see, Bernard Harcourt, Against Profiling, 
supra note 116, arguing that the assumptions of consistent responses – or elasticities – across 
different racial groups is unrealistic given their overall exposure to both legal earning and the 
potential punishment costs from detection.  
217 Billy R. Close and Patrick Leon Mason, Searching for Efficient Enforcement: Officer 
Characteristics and Racially Biased Policing, 3 Review of Law & Economics 263 (2007); Jeffrey 
Fagan and Amanda B. Geller, Profiling and Consent, Working Paper, Columbia Law School 
(2010), at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1641326; J. Mitchell Pickerill, Clayton Mosher and Travis 
Pratt, Search And Seizure, Racial Profiling, and Traffic Stops: A Disparate Impact Framework, 3 
Law & Policy 1 (2009). But see, Rob Tillyer, Charles F. Klahm, and Robin S. Engel, The 
Discretion to Search A Multilevel Examination of Driver Demographics and Officer 
Characteristics, 28 Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 184-205 (2012) (showing that 
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However, the previous studies using officer-race benchmarks have examined bias 
in vehicle searches pursuant to traffic stops. In our strategy, we exploit the availability of 
these same data to estimate race-based preferences among officers in street stops, 
preferences that are not easily explained by assumptions about each group’s propensity 
for crime. 	  
1.  Disparate Treatment by Race 	  
	  
The general test for evidence of disparate treatment is a regression equation that 
takes the form: 	  
Outcome = α +β1*Minority + Σiβi*(Plausible Non-Race Influences) + εi	  
where Outcome is the event or status of interest, Minority is an indicator for the racial 
composition or status of the unit observed (i.e., neighborhood or person, depending on 
the outcome), Plausible Non-Race Influences are a set of variables representing non-race 
factors that also might influence the outcome, and an error term ε that captures the 
variation in the outcome that cannot be explained by either Minority status or the Non-
Race Influences. These models may include non-race influences that are correlated with 
race, so as to better identify the unique effects of race that are present once the influence 
of proxies for race are removed.218 The goal in specifying these models is to identify the 
effects of race on outcomes after simultaneously considering factors that may be relevant 
to race.219 Under a disparate treatment theory, the critical question is whether an 
applicant’s race was the cause of being denied employment. Failure to do so raises the 
risk of “omitted variable bias,” which could lead to erroneous conclusions about the 
effects of variables that do appear in a regression test.220	  
	  
2. Measures and Model Specification	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
suspect race effects are reduced after controlling for a set of contextual effects, but remain 
significant). 
218 For a general discussion of the specification of regression models to test for disparate 
treatment, see generally D. James Greiner, Causal Inference in Civil Rights Litigation, 122 Har. 
L. Rev. 533 (2008). For a general discussion of how regressions sort out the influences of 
predictors of an outcome, see Thomas J. Campbell, Regression Analysis in Title VII Cases: 
Minimum Standards, Comparable Worth, and Other Issues Where Law and Statistics Meet, 36 
Stanford L. Rev. 1299 (1984). 
219 See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).  In a disparate treatment claim, we 
would ask if the use of a high school diploma requirement biases the hiring process since African 
American job applicants may be less likely to have obtained a high school diploma. Once this 
race-correlated control is introduced, it would likely reduce the racial disparity in the hiring rates 
and provide a different test than would a simple disparate impact test. 
220 See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Testing for Discrimination and the Problem of ‘Included Variable Bias’, 
Yale Law School Working Paper (2010), available at 
http://islandia.law.yale.edu/ayres/ayresincludedvariablebias.pdf; Ian Ayres, Three Tests for 
Measuring Unjustified Disparate Impacts in Organ Transplantation: The Problem of ‘Included 
Variable’ Bias, 48 Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 68 (2005). 
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We analyze differences in stop rates by neighborhood to determine whether FIO 
activity is explained by local crime rates, or if there is additional variance that is 
explained by race.  A race-neutral practice would predict a positive effect for local crime 
rates and non-significant effects for race once we control for crime.	  
The neighborhood analyses were conducted using 2010 U.S. Census tracts as the 
principal unit of analysis.  Census tracts were used instead of BPD geographic units (e.g. 
districts, reporting areas) or smaller areal units (e.g. Census block groups, street 
segments). Tracts are areas roughly equivalent to neighborhoods developed by the U.S. 
Census Bureau for the purposes of analyzing populations.221  According to the 2010 U.S. 
Census, Boston was comprised of N=181 tracts. Data on the social and economic 
conditions in these tracts were obtained from the 2007-2010 American Community 
Survey (ACS).222 Eight tracts were excluded from the analysis because there were no 
residents in these areas for a total N=173 tracts.223 The FIO data included date and 
geographical location (x-y coordinates) information that permitted aggregation of FIO 
counts to Census tracts and by differing time periods.224 The main outcome variable was 
the monthly count of FIOs made in each Census tract between 2007 and 2010 (N=8,304; 
173 Census tracts with 48 observations each).	  
The specific estimation technique for this analysis, or the functional form of the 
regression equation, was responsive to the specific measure of FIO activity (monthly 
counts in Census tract units). Accordingly, models were estimated using negative 
binomial regressions.  This class of regression models is appropriate for counts of events, 
such as FIO reports in a specific area, where assumptions about the independence of 
events cannot be reliably made.225  These models also are appropriate for counts where 
the distribution are over-dispersed; that is, where the variance exceeds the sample mean. 
The model takes the form of: 𝑝 𝑦 = 𝑃 𝑌! = 𝑦! = Г 𝑦! + 𝜙𝑦!! Γ 𝜙 𝜙!𝜆!!!𝜙 + 𝜆! !!!! 	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
221 https://www.census.gov/geo/reference/gtc/gtc_ct.html; Nancy Krieger, A Century of Census 
Tracts: Health and the Body Politic (1906–2006), 83(3) Journal of Urban Health 355 (2006). 
222 http://www.census.gov/acs/ 
223 These eight Census tracts included the Stony Brook reservation, Belle Isle Marsh reservation, 
the Harbor Islands, the Esplanade recreational area, the Franklin Park recreational area, and three 
commercial property waterfront areas. 
224 95.2% (194,858 of 204,739) of the FIO reports were geocoded to 2010 Census Tracts in 
Boston. 
225 Negative binomial regressions also are especially useful for discrete data such as event counts 
when the variance exceeds the mean across areas. Joseph M. Hilbe, Negative Binomial 
Regression (2007). See, also, Richard Berk and John M. MacDonald, Overdispersion and 
Poisson Regression, 24 J. Quant. Criminology 269 (2008); D. Wayne Osgood, Poisson-Based 
Regression Analysis of Aggregate Crime Rates, 16 J. Quant. Criminology 21 (2000); David A. 
Freedman, Statistical Models: Theory and Practice (2005); William Greene, Econometric 
Analysis (5th ED.) (2003). 
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where Yi is the expected count of events in each unit i given parameters   that we 
observe. We estimate the incidence of events for overdispersed models as: 	  Ε 𝑦𝑖 Χ𝑖, 𝜀𝑖 = exp 𝛼 +   𝜒𝑖!𝛽 +   𝜀𝑖 = ℎ𝑖𝜆𝑖 
where hi = exp(εi ) is assumed to have a one parameter gamma distribution, G (θ 
,θ ) with mean 1 and variance 1 / θ  = κ .	  
We used a specific form of negative binomial regression known as General 
Estimating Equations (GEEs).226 GEEs are beneficial for nested or hierarchically 
organized data, such as years within Census tracts, as they allow for the specification of 
within-subject correlations of observations.  These nesting variables are treated as 
random effects in the estimating models.  Random effects here include census tract 
correlations.  To adjust for difference in population densities in the census tracts, we 
estimated population-averaged models.  Since the analyses include a sequence of time 
periods (calendar months), the models include an AR(1) variance estimation function that 
adjusts for the serial autocorrelation (or autoregression) of the counts of events within 
sampling units over long periods of time.227 We controlled for yearly and seasonal 
variations228 in the monthly counts of FIO reports by including fixed-effects for calendar 
quarter and year.229	  
Police activity in Boston is closely linked to crime.230  As such, we test whether 
crime rates in a neighborhood are linked to the intensity of BPD FIO activity in that area.  
We use crime incident data generated by the BPD on 113,419 “index” crime incidents in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
226 James W. Hardin and Joseph M. Hilbe, Generalized Estimating Equations (2003); Gary A. 
Ballinger, Using Generalized Estimating Equations for Longitudinal Data Analysis, 7 
Organizational Research Methods 127 (2004).  
227 AR(1) adjustments reflect the reality that the best predictor of what the crime rate will be in 
the next month is what it was in last month.  This is an empirical constraint in identifying the 
relationship between crime and policing. Failure to correct for this temporal dependence will bias 
the standard errors in estimates of crime effects on policing, and this distortion remains even 
when fixed effects are used to control for temporal trends. See, Badi Baltagi, Econometric 
Analysis of Panel Data (2001); Badi Baltagi and Qi Li, Testing AR(1) Against MA(1) 
Disturbances in an Error Component Model, 68 Journal of Econometrics 133 (1995).  
228 There is a long tradition of studies of the seasonality of crime and the theoretical explanations 
for why crime varies by season.  See, e.g., John R. Hipp, et al., Crime of Opportunity or Crimes 
of Emotion? Testing Two Explanations of Seasonal Change in Crime, 82 Social Forces 1333 
(2004). 
229  We created indicator variables to account for seasonal variations by calendar quarter. Quarter 
1 represented January, February, and March monthly FIO counts (1 = Yes, 0 = No). Quarter 2 
represented April, May, and June monthly FIO counts (1 = Yes, 0 = No). Quarter 3 represented 
July, August, and September monthly FIO counts (1 = Yes, 0 = No). Quarter 4 represented 
October, November, and December monthly FIO counts (1 = Yes, 0 = No). Quarter 1 served as 
the reference category for the seasonal polychotomous dummy variable. We also created 
indicator variables for year to account for annual variations in the data.  
230 Anthony A. Braga, et al., An Ex-Post-Facto Evaluation Framework for Place-Based Police 
Interventions, 35 Evaluation Review 592 (2011). 
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Boston between 2007 and 2010.231  These crime incident data were geocoded,  and then 
aggregated by Census tract and month of occurrence to create a covariate measuring 
lagged and logged monthly counts of serious crime in Boston census tracts.232 As Figure 
2 reveals, FIO reports made by BPD officers in 2010 tended to concentrate in census 
tracts with higher rates of total crime incidents and higher percentages of black resident 
populations.  Figure 2 also shows a high degree of spatial autocorrelation in the 
concentration of FIO reports across Census tracts.233 We controlled for this spatial 
dependence in our regression models by including a Moran’s I spatial effects covariate.234	  
We also control for police deployment patterns.  The allocation of police and 
targeting of police activity frequently involved “saturation” deployment of police patrols 
in higher crime areas.  Since these areas in Boston and elsewhere often had higher 
concentrations of non-White residents,235 asymmetrical deployments of police increased 
exposure of citizens to police and thus the increased probability of encounters with 
minority citizens as compared to Whites,236 in turn producing racial or ethnic differences 
in contact patterns.  Accordingly, an analysis of FIO patterns by neighborhood required 
an understanding of the allocation of police patrol resources in each unit of analysis.  
Patrol strength data were provided by the BPD for each of their eleven policing districts 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
231 Index crimes, as defined by the FBI, included murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, 
burglary, auto theft, and larceny.  See http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr (accessed August 1, 
2014). Using ArcGIS 10.2 mapping software, the BRIC was able to geocode 113,152 of these 
incidents to their respective Census tracts (99.8 % of 113419 total crime incidents). 
232 All models control for the one-month-lag of logged total crime incidents.  The natural log 
transformation of the actual number of crimes was used.  Log transformation is necessary to 
adjust when the distributions are highly skewed and non-linear.  The lag reflects the police 
planning process whereby FIO reports and other enforcement activity are adjusted to reflect 
actual crime conditions. 
233 Spatial dependence, or autocorrelation, violates the assumption of independence among 
observations used in most statistical models.  Spatial regression analyses of the variation of crime, 
etc. across neighborhood units account for spatial autocorrelation through the addition of a spatial 
effects covariate  such as Moran’s I . The argument is that analyses that do not compensate for 
spatial dependency can have unstable parameter estimates and yield unreliable significance tests.  
See, Michael D. Ward and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, Spatial Regression Models, Quantitative 
Applications in the Social Sciences series, No. 155, 8 – 10 (2008). 
234 ArcGIS 10.2 was used to export a shapefile containing the total number of FIOs made per U.S. 
Census Tract during the study time period to GeoDa 1.4.6 spatial analysis software.  Using 
queen’s contiguity, a Moran’s I = 0.674689 was estimated (199 permutations, z = 14.73, p<.005; 
99 permutations, z = 15.18, p<.01).  The Moran’s I spatial autocorrelation lag for each Census 
Tract was exported to Stata 13.1 and included in the neighborhood analysis. 
235 Ruth D. Peterson and Luaren J. Krivo. Segregated Spatial Locations, Race-Ethnic 
Composition, and Neighborhood Violent Crime, 623(1) The Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science, 93-107 (2009). 
236 See, e.g., Donald Tomaskovic-Devey, Marcinda Mason, and Mattew Zingraff, Looking for the 
Driving While Black Phenomena: Conceptualizing Racial Bias Processes and their Associated 
Distributions, 7 Police Quarterly 3 (2004). 
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between 2007 and 2010. These patrol data were then allocated to the each Boston census 
tract.237	  
It is also important to note that the regulation and oversight of FIO policy and 
activities takes place at the police district level.  There are 12 police districts in Boston, 
each commanded by a police captain who reports directly to the Superintendent of the 
Bureau of Field Services. BPD Captains are accountable for district-level crime trends 
and have discretion to allocate officers tactically within districts.  Since tracts are nested 
within Boston’s policing districts, we included fixed effects to account for any 
unobserved effects of conditions in the districts that might influence police activity, such 
as district-level variations in the use of FIOs to gather intelligence and maintain contact 
with potential offenders.238	  
Several studies show that neighborhood crime rates, including violent crime, 239  
are strongly associated with concentrated social disadvantage. The concentrated 
disadvantage index is a standardized index composed of the percentage of residents who 
are black, the percentage of residents receiving public assistance, the percentage of 
families living below the poverty line, the percentage of female-headed households with 
children under the age of 18, and the percentage of unemployed residents (as measured 
by the percentage of men over the age 16 who did not work in the previous year).240 
Since we are explicitly interested the independent impact of race on the number of FIO 
reports in a neighborhood controlling for other factors, we excluded the percentage of 
black residents from the construction of the Boston concentrated disadvantage used in 
this analysis.   Because of the high correlation among these variables, we conducted 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
237 Because BPD districts do not, as a rule, share boundaries with Census tracts, we allocated 
patrol strength to tracts based on the percent of each district’s area that falls into each tract. For 
example, if Census tract A shares area with three police districts (A1, A2, and A3), the Census 
tract patrol strength was estimated as [(% of A1 falling into tract A * patrol strength of A1) + (% 
of A2 falling into tract A * patrol strength of A2) + (% of A3 falling into tract A * patrol strength 
of A3)]. 
238 The BPD has 12 districts that provide policing services across Boston’s neighborhoods: A-1 
serving Downtown, Beacon Hill, and Chinatown neighborhoods; A-15 serving Charlestown; A-7 
serving East Boston; B-2 serving Roxbury and Mission Hill neighborhoods; B-3 serving 
Mattapan and parts of North Dorchester; C-6 serving South Boston; C-11 serving most of 
Dorchester; D-4 serving Back Bay, Fenway, and South End neighborhoods; D-14 serving Allston 
and Brighton neighborhoods; E-5 serving West Roxbury and Roslindale neighborhoods; E-13 
serving Jamaica Plain; and E-18 serving Hyde Park.  The reference category for the BPD district 
dummy variable was E-13. For a basic review of the use of dummy variables in regression 
models, see: Melissa A. Hardy, Regression with Dummy Variables, 93 Quantitative Applications 
in the Social Sciences series 7-16 (1993). 
239 Robert J. Sampson and William Julius Wilson, Toward a theory of race, crime, and urban 
inequality in Crime and Inequality (John Hagan and Ruth Peterson, eds.) 37-56 (1995); Robert J. 
Sampson, Steven Raudenbush and Felton Earls, Neighborhoods and violent crime: A Multilevel 
Study of Collective Efficacy, 277 Science 918 (1997); Jeffrey D. Morenoff, Robert J. Sampson 
and Steven Raudenbush, Neighborhood Inequality, Collective Efficacy, and the Spatial Dynamics 
of Urban Violence, 39 Criminology 517-59 (2001).   
240 Sampson et al., Collective Efficacy, (2001) supra note 243; Morenoff et al., Neighborhood 
Inequality and Collective Efficacy, (2001) supra note 243 
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principal components factor analysis to identify the underlying dimensions among the 
variables.241 This procedure revealed that variables load on a single factor (which was 
retained as a standardized disadvantage index variable).242    The presence of 
concentrations of recent immigrants is a protective factor that reduces the risk of crime in 
a neighborhood.243  As such, we created a variable that measured the percentage of 
foreign-born residents in each Census tract.	  
	  
3.  Benchmarks	  
The selection of a benchmark against which to assess police enforcement activity 
is a basic question in reliably measuring the extent of racial disparities in police-citizen 
interactions. 244  A benchmark allows us to determine if Boston Police are selectively, on 
the basis of race or another prohibited factor, singling out persons for FIO reports. As 
such, we compare the police decision to complete an FIO report on someone to their 
availability and eligibility for such reports, and compare that calculation across racial and 
ethnic groups.  It is not hard to see that the reliability of an estimate of the extent of racial 
disproportionality or fairness is likely to depend on – and be particularly sensitive to – the 
benchmark used to measure criminal behavior.	  
Population is one measure of the supply of people available to the police for 
surveillance and possibly stops.  However, there are constraints on local population 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
241Factor analysis is a statistical technique that captures consistency among observed variables to 
generate a composite measure using a lower number of unobserved variables. The method 
produces factors that represent the correlations among the observed measures. See Jae-On Kim et 
al., Factor Analysis: Statistical Methods and Practical Issues (1978). The principal components 
factor analysis was completed using STATA 13.1. 
242 For example, a Boston Census tract featuring a disadvantage index score of 1.5 would be 1.5 
standard deviations more disadvantaged than the mean Boston Census tract.  As such, the 
disadvantage index is adjusted specifically for the city of Boston using 2010 ACS variables, even 
while the components used to construct the index remain constant across much neighborhood 
research and remain robust predictors of crime across a variety of city types and spatial 
aggregations. See Sampson et al., Collective Efficacy, supra note 243; Morenoff et al., 
Neighborhood Inequality and Collective Efficacy, supra note 243. 
243 See, e.g., Robert J. Sampson, Rethinking Crime and Immigration 7(1) Contexts 28-33 (2008). 
Available at http://contexts.org/articles/winter-2008/sampson/ 
244 The issues in benchmarking for pedestrian stops can be different from those that influence 
decisions on how to benchmark for traffic stops. See, generally, Lori A. Fridell, By the Numbers: 
A Guide for Analyzing Data from Vehicle Stops, Washington DC: Police Executive Research 
Forum (2004); Jeffrey Fagan, Law, Social Science and Racial Profiling, 4 Justice Research and 
Policy 104 (2002); Ian Ayres, Outcome Tests of Racial Disparities in Police Practices, 4 Justice 
Research and Policy 133 (2002); Greg Ridgeway and John MacDonald, Methods for Assessing 
Racially Biased Policing, in Race, Ethnicity and Policing: Essential Readings (S.K. Rice and 
M.D. White, eds.) 180 (2010). See, also, Samuel Walker, Searching for the Denominator: 
Problems with Police Traffic Stop Data and an Early Warning Solution, 4 Justice Research and 
Policy 133 (2002). The Fagan and Walker articles respectively wrestle with the unique demands 
of benchmarking for pedestrian stops. 
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estimates that limit its utility as a benchmark for the behavior of the police.  Residential 
population estimates in commercial parts of Boston are often unreliable estimates of the 
actual composition of persons who are visible and available to the police during certain 
hours of the day.  And, similarly, if people leave residential areas to work in commercial 
areas, the estimates in the residential areas will also be biased and inaccurate.	  
Another reason that population may not be an incomplete benchmark is that BPD 
officers do not complete FIO reports randomly based on the population parameters of an 
area.  In fact, police complete FIO reports of persons based on, at least in theory, their 
perceptions of suspected crime, or their evaluation of citizen behaviors that may provide 
reasonable indicia of the potential that a crime has occurred or is about to take place.245 
To the extent that rates of crime suspicion are correlated with rates of crime commission, 
observed crime rates are useful candidates to serve as a component of a benchmark.246	  
For this analysis of BPD FIO activity, a valid benchmark requires estimates of the 
supply of individuals of each racial or ethnic group who are engaged in the targeted 
behaviors and who are available to the police as targets of their stop authority and 
intelligence gathering activities.  Since police often target resources to the places where 
crime rates and risks are highest, and where populations are highest, some measure of 
population that is conditioned on crime rates is an optimal candidate for inclusion as a 
benchmark.	  
The challenge in following this strategy is to identify a valid measure of crime.  
Ideally, we would include measures of the race-specific crime rates in each tract (or other 
social area) to help construct precise benchmarks based on the participation in the 
behavior of interest by persons of each race and ethnicity.  However, there are practical 
problems in this approach.  For example, many crimes are unreported to the police, and 
there are no valid victim surveys from which we can measure crime rates. There are 
similarly no surveys of self-reported crimes. Race-specific arrest rates have been used as 
a proxy for race-specific crime rates, with a lag function that reduces (but hardly 
eliminates) the problem of correlated error terms between current enforcement and past 
enforcement.247  However, there is strong disagreement about the validity of prior arrest 
rates, with some analysts offering positive rationales,248 while others have been critical.249	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
245 Bernard E. Harcourt and Tracey L. Meares, Randomization and the Fourth Amendment. 
Working paper, Uni. Chi. L. Rev. (2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1665562 
246 Geoffrey Alpert et al., Police Suspicion and Discretionary Decision Making during Citizen 
Stops, 43 Criminology 407 (2005). 
247 See, for example, Andrew Gelman, Jeffrey Fagan, and Alex Kiss, An Analysis of the NYPD’s 
Stop-and-Frisk Policy in the Context of Claims of Racial Bias, Journal of the American Statistical 
Association 813 (2007); Jeffrey Fagan et al., Street Stops and Broken Windows Revisited: The 
Demography and Logic of Proactive Policing in a Safe and Changing City, in Race, Ethnicity 
and Policing: New and Essential Readings 309 (S.K. Rice and M.D. White, eds. 2010).  
248 ? 
249 Arrest data incorporate information about crime patterns, but also contain uncertainty about 
unobservable components because of police decisions about allocating officers to specific places. 
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An alternative measure is crimes reported to the police.  However, crime reports 
don’t provide a complete picture of the racial makeup of the offenders in those crimes.  
While crime reports may provide a snapshot of the racial composition of those involved 
in crime commission, it is just that: a snapshot with only partial coverage of criminal 
activity.  The data are further limited by the fact that many reported crimes lack a suspect 
identification or description. Moreover, some types of suspected crimes that motivate 
FIO activity, such as weapons possession or drug possession, often do not follow from 
crime reports that identify the race of a suspect, so these base rates of offending are 
unknown.  Calls for service to the police are yet a third index, but 911 calls of this sort 
are difficult to apply to proactive patrol or the “new policing” given varying incidents of 
mistaken reports and the heterogeneity of the purpose of the calls that include serious 
crimes, cats in trees, multiple reports of the same gunshot, domestic disturbances, or car 
break-ins.250	  
To the extent that observed or reported crimes are leading indicators of those 
behaviors that are correlated with crime, crimes known to the police are important part of 
a valid benchmark.  So too is population, as an index of the overall exposure of citizen as 
available targets for surveillance and interdiction.  Accordingly, these analyses use both 
population and reported crime as benchmarks for understanding the racial distribution of 
FIO reports.  Sensitivity tests applied alternate benchmarks including lagged race-specific 
arrest rates251 and lagged race-specific suspect rates.252 Natural log of the Census tract 
population, total number of arrested individuals in Census tract, and total number of 
suspects reported in Census tract were used as the offsets in the regression models.	  
These analyses were designed to test whether monthly counts of FIO reports in 
Census tracts were disproportionate to the racial composition of tract residents, racial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Greg Ridgeway and John MacDonald, Race, Ethnicity and Policing: New and Essential 
Readings, 180 (S.K. Rice and M.D. White, eds. 2010).  
250 See, Robin S. Engel, Michael R. Smith and Francis T. Cullen, Race, Place, and Drug 
Enforcement, 11 Criminology & Public Policy 603 (2012) (claiming that 911 calls are a more 
robust and accurate measure of the relative crime problems in an area than are either arrests or 
reported crimes).  But see, Stephen D. Mastrofski, Race, Policing, and Equity, 11 Criminology & 
Public Policy 593 (2012) (critiquing the use of 911 calls as a basis of suspicion to either allocate 
officers or justify the formation of suspicions necessary for a valid Terry stop or probable cause 
for a search or an arrest). 
251 Between 2007 and 2010, the BPD arrested 28,427 suspects.  The racial distribution of arrested 
suspects was as follows: 50.4% Black, 26.8% White, 20.6% Hispanic, and 2.2% Asian or other 
race category. Using ArcGIS 10.2 mapping software, the BRIC was able to geocode 24,590 of 
these arrests to their respective Census tracts (86.5% of 28,427 total arrests). While a 100% 
geocoding rate is always desired, the geocode rate in the current study exceeds the minimum 
acceptable threshold of 85%. See Jerry H. Ratcliffe, Geocoding Crime and a First Estimate of a 
Minimum Acceptable Hit Rate, 18 International Journal of Geographical Information Science, 61-
72 (2004). 
252 As described earlier, between 2007 and 2010, there were 113,419 Part I UCR crime incidents 
in Boston.  Victims in these incidents reported information on 340,585 suspects. The racial 
distribution of these suspects was as follows: 41.2% Black, 21.8% White, 17.3% Hispanic, 2.0% 
Asian or other race category, and 17.7% unknown race.  
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composition of arrested suspects in the tract, and the racial composition of crime suspects 
as reported by victims in crime incident reports, after controlling for the known crime 
rate in the previous month and other characteristics that are correlated with crime. For 
each racial composition benchmark, three race categories (percent Black, percent 
Hispanic, and Percent Asian / other) are included and the category of percent White is 
omitted.  This was done to avoid collinearity in the model estimation. As such, the 
coefficients for each racial group are based on comparison with the percent White of the 
benchmark in the tract.  When a racial composition variable is significant, this means that 
its relationship to FIO activity is significantly different from that of the White racial 
composition of that benchmark in the Census tract. 	  The parameter estimates were 
expressed as incidence rate ratios (i.e., exponentiated coefficients)253 and robust standard 
errors clustered by tracts were used.254	  
	  
V.  RESULTS	  
	  
A.  Suspects and Officers	  
	  
Table 1 shows the characteristics of both suspects and officers. Suspect identifiers 
were available for 199,331 (97.4% of 204,739) FIO encounters between 2007 and 2010.  
From these, we were able to identify N = 72,619 unique subjects. Using gang intelligence 
databases maintained by BPD, we estimated that 5.5 percent (3,967 of 72,619) of the 
suspects in FIO encounters were classified as gang members.255  The number of FIO’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
253 Incidence rate ratios are interpreted as the rate at which things occur; for example, an 
incidence rate ratio of 1.10 would suggest that, controlling for other independent variables, a one 
unit increase in the selected independent variable was associated with a 10% increase in the rate 
at which the dependent variable occurs. See, Sophie Rabe-Hesketh and Anders Skrondal, 
Multilevel and Longitudinal Modeling Using Stata, Volume II: Categorical Responses, Counts 
and Survival, 3rd ed. (2012).  See, also, Kenneth Rothman and S. Greenland, Modern 
Epidemiology, 3rd ed. (2008). 
254 Greg Ridgeway and John MacDonald, Doubly Robust Internal Benchmarking and False 
Discovery Rates for Detecting Racial Bias in Police Stops, 104 Journal of the American 
Statistical Association 661 (2009).  See, also Gary King and Margaret E. Roberts, How Robust 
Standard Errors Expose Methodological Problems they Do Not Fix, and What to Do About It, 
mpu015 Political Analysis (2014).  
255 See, Anthony A. Braga, David M. Hureau, and Leigh Grossman, Managing the Group 
Violence Intervention: Using Shooting Scorecards to Track Group Violence, 15 (2014). The 
Boston Regional Intelligence Center (BRIC) created a classification system using several 
parameters to identify individuals as gang members. To be classified as a gang member by BRIC, 
a person has to accumulate 10 points based upon the following criteria: prior validation by a 
BRIC-affiliated criminal justice agency that uses the same selection criteria (9 points), prior 
validation by a non-BRIC-affiliated criminal justice agency that uses similar selection criteria (8 
points), self-admitted gang membership (8 points), use and/or possession of gang paraphernalia or 
identifiers (4 points), gang-related photograph (2 points), known gang tattoo or marking (8 
points), information from reliable confidential informant (5 points), information from anonymous 
source or tipster (1 point), crime victim associated with rival gang (3 or 8 points depending on 
incarceration status), possession of gang documents such as by-laws (3 or 8 points depending on 
incarceration status), possession of gang publications (2 points), participation in gang publication 
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per suspect ranged from 1 to 249, with an average of 2.74 FIO events per suspect, during 
the study period.  About half (48.5 percent) had been arrested, with the number of arrests 
ranged from 1 to 63, with a mean of 5 arrests. 	  
Table 1 here	  
Most suspects were young: nearly half were younger than 25 years of age.  One in 
three (33.7%) were between 18 and 24 years of age.  Most were male (81.8%), consistent 
with known gender differences in crime rates by gender.256  Most suspects were Black 
(42.5%) or Hispanic (13.3%), each above their respective share of population in Boston 
in the 2010 census.  Whites were under-represented in the FIO subject pool relative to 
population share.  As we discussed earlier, population is a weak benchmark, and we 
control for local crime rates in subsequent analyses.  	  
About half of the FIO suspects (48.5%) had one or more prior arrests, and half did 
not.  To the extent that stops in general carry risks of social and psychological harms,257 
the reach of FIOs to persons with no prior record extends an umbrella of suspicion to a 
group of primarily young people with no known criminal involvement.  	  
Gangs are a focus of Boston police tactics.  Yet few of the FIO suspects (5.5%) 
were known to the police as gang members.  The department’s gang unit was 
proportionately small, with 3.7% of the population of officers whose shields were in the 
FIO database. 	  
BPD Officers were older, not surprisingly, but their age distribution suggests that 
they were experienced. More than half were over 40 years of age (50.9%), with a median 
age of 41.3 years.  Nearly two officers in three were White (65.1%), and about one in 
four were Black (23.9%).  Most were assigned to patrol commands, with about one in 
eight (12.1%) holding a detective’s shield.	  
The number of repeat FIO reports per subject is concentrated among a small 
number of individuals who experience large numbers of FIO encounters. Table 2 shows 
that about two FIO subjects in three (67.5 percent) experienced one FIO.  As a group, 
they accounted for 24.6 percent of the total number of FIO reports from 2007 – 2010. 
About one in 20 (5.2 percent) experienced 10 or more FIOs and, as a group, accounted 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(8 points), possession of court and/or investigative documents involving an identified gang 
member (9 points), possession of printed or electronic media indicating membership (1 point), 
contact with known gang members via Field Interrogation Observation reports (2 points per 
report), named in police incident report involving known gang member (4 points per report), 
possession of gang membership material (9 points), information developed during surveillance 
and/or surveillance (5 points), and other information (1 point).  
256 Janet L. Lauritsen, Karen Heimer, and James P. Lynch, Trends in the Gender Gap in Violent 
Offending: New Evidence from the National Crime Victimization Survey, 47 Criminology 361 
(2009). 
257 See, Terry Stuntz, Impossibility, supra note 110.  See, also, Ekow Yankah, Policing Ourselves: 
A Republican Theory of Citizenship, Dignity and Policing- A Comment on Fagan, Fordham L. 
Rev. (2013), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2258048. 
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for 40.2 percent of the total number of FIO reports made by BPD officers during this 
time.	  
Table 2 here	  
FIO forms also report the badge numbers of the BPD officers who filled out the 
reports. Officer badge numbers were available for N=200,103 FIO reports (97.7% of 
204,739). BPD personnel records identified 2,359 unique officers in its workforce 
between 2007 and 2010, including new hires and retirements during that time period. 
Personnel records were used to determine officer demographic information, years on the 
job, rank, assignment, and detective status for all sworn BPD officers.  Badge numbers on 
FIO reports were used to identify the N=1,750 unique BPD officers. 	  
Table 3 here	  
About three officers in four (74.2% of 2,359) made one or more FIO reports 
between 2007 and 2010.  The counts ranged from 1 to 2,315 FIOs. Officers averaged 
84.3 FIOs over the four years, or 21 per year.  Table 3 shows that, similar to the 
distribution of repeat FIOs among subjects, the number of repeat FIO reports per officer 
is also highly concentrated among a small number of individuals (Table 3). Nearly half 
(45.0 percent) generated fewer than 50 FIO reports and, as a group, accounted for 6.9 
percent of the total number of FIO reports during the study time period. A small group 
(4.0 percent, or approximately 70 officers) generated 500 or more FIOs; they accounted 
for 43.3 percent of the total number of FIO reports made by BPD officers from 2007 - 
2010.	  
	  
C.  Race, Crime and FIOs	  
1. FIOs by Neighborhood Crime and Social Conditions	  
Table 4 shows the results of the estimates of FIO activity using alternate 
benchmarks for racial composition.  The monthly number of total Index crimes (logged, 
lagged) in a tract was a consistently significant positive predictor of the monthly count of 
FIO reports in a tract across models with varying benchmarks. This suggests that the 
intensity of BPD FIO activity in a tract is associated with the amount of serious crime 
experienced in a tract controlling for other conditions.  An increase of 1 percent more 
total index crime incidents in the previous month leads to an increase of 10.6 percent 
(IRR=1.106) FIO reports in the following month. This is a large effect, considering that 
the average Boston census tract experiences 12.2 index crimes per month.  Each of the 
models in Table 4 show that the Boston police prioritized crime problems in the 
allocation of FIO activity by tract and police district during this period.	  
Table 4 here	  
After controlling for crime, Table 4 also shows that the racial composition 
variables for Percent Black and Percent Hispanic are positive and significant for all three 
models. The pattern of race effects suggests evidence of disparate treatment in FIO 
activity based on neighborhood racial composition. After controlling for local crime 
rates, we observe higher rates of FIO activity for census tracts based on their Black or 
Hispanic racial composition, whether in residents, arrestees, or the race of known crime 
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suspects.  In each of these specifications, the percentage of Foreign Born Residents in a 
tract was also a statistically-significant predictor of increased FIO activity. Since foreign 
born residents of Boston are primarily persons of color, the focus of FIO activity in those 
neighborhoods reinforces the notion of disparate treatment by race and ethnicity.	  
The consistent size and direction of the race and ethnicity coefficients suggests a 
robust race effect controlling for crime, police activity, and other relevant factors, even if 
they were modest in size.  Still, even modest effects can have practical significance. The 
disparity in the monthly count of FIO reports can be meaningful in census tracts with 
larger shares of minority residents, arrestees, and reported suspects. Using the residential 
racial composition variable as an example, the incidence rate ratio on Percent Black 
suggests that a one-unit increase in the black percentage of residents relative to the white 
percentage of residents in a Census tract is associated with a 2.2 percent increase 
(IRR=1.022) in the monthly count of FIO reports made by the BPD controlling for crime 
and other factors. The effects of race (and foreign born residents) in Table 4 were 
observed after controlling for the number of officers deployed in each police district, a 
measure of the exposure of local residents to police and their availability for FIO 
contacts.	  
Figure 3 here	  
Figure 3 shows the marginal increase in the predicted count of monthly FIO 
reports in a census tract as the percentages of Black and Hispanic residents in a tract 
increase.  The figure shows the nearly linear and monotonic increase in the adjusted (for 
predictors) monthly count of FIO reports increases as the percentages of minority 
residents increases in a tract.  Simply to illustrate, Figure 3 shows that a tract with 85 
percent black residents would experience an additional 53 FIO reports per month 
compared to a tract with 15 percent black residents.  Over the course of one year, 
residents in that tract would be subjected to an additional 636 FIO reports and, over the 
four-year study time period, this difference would represent an additional 2,544 FIO 
reports in that tract.	  
Because crime and racial composition are unevenly distributed across tracts and 
neighborhoods in Boston, similar to other cities, we tested for the possible leverage of 
outliers in the estimates in Table 4.258  That is, both of the central findings in Table 4 on 
crime and race could reflect the undue leverage and influence of neighborhood outliers in 
each of these distributions.259  For example, Figure 2 shows the concentration of crimes 
and race in particular corners of the city.  To test for the effects of outliers, we conducted 
a sensitivity test by trimming 20 percent of tracts at the extremes of the FIO activity 
distributions.  The results were largely unchanged.  Using a population benchmark 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
258 Krivo and Peterson, Segregated Spatial Locations, Race-Ethnic Composition, and 
Neighborhood Violent Crime (2009), supra note 262. 
259 For an example of an estimation of leverage effects of outliers, see Richard A. Berk, New 
claims about executions and general deterrence: Déja Vu all over again? 2 Journal of Empirical 
Legal Studies 303 (2005) (showing the undue influence of Texas in state-year fixed effects 
estimates of the deterrent effects of executions on homicides).  
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(Model 1 in Table 4), the IRR for percent Black population decline from 1.022 to 1.018 
in the narrower model.  For crime, the IRR of crime on FIO counts dropped from 1.106 to 
1.088.  In other words, the FIO / race / crime relationship is robust to the removal of the 
extremes. 	  
	  
2.  FIO Activity by Suspect Characteristics	  
FIOs are a first-stage intrusion by police on individual liberty and privacy.  But in 
Boston, the use of non-contact FIOs carries a lower level of intrusion.  While privacy 
may be violated in the sense that one’s movements in these contacts are recorded by a 
police officer acting on behalf of the state, a non-contact incident does not have the same 
physical intrusion nor temporary detention and liberty implications of a full contact stop. 
To compare race effects on contact versus non-contact encounters, we estimated negative 
binomial regressions of subject race and other individual characteristics on FIO counts.  
The models were estimated with and without gang membership status and arrest history 
to examine how individual criminality might mediate any observed race effects. Model 1 
in Table 5 shows the results for all FIO encounters.  Model 2 controls for arrest history 
and gang membership, an adjustment that acknowledges the more intense surveillance 
and contact rates with suspected gang members or persons suspected by the police to be 
involved in criminal activity.  Model 3 re-estimates Model 2 for only non-contact FIO 
encounters.	  
Table 5 here	  
 In Model 1, Black and Hispanic suspects have significantly higher FIO activity 
compared to Whites.   The effect size for Blacks is especially large and more modest for 
Hispanic suspects.  For Asian and Other Race suspects, they are less likely to be the 
subject of an FIO encounter compared to Whites, and the results also are significant.  
Older suspects and females are less likely to be subjects of FIO encounters.  	  
Comparing Models 1 and 2, prior arrest history and gang membership each 
mediate the influence of race on the number of FIO encounters experienced by subjects, 
reducing the size of the race estimates but they remain statistically significant. Model 1 
shows that compared to White subjects, Black subjects experienced 72.5 percent more 
FIO encounters per month across the city and Hispanic subjects experienced 13.6 percent 
more FIO encounters.  When the prior arrest and gang status covariates are included, in 
Model 2, Black subjects experienced only 8.8 percent more FIO encounters per month 
and Hispanic subjects experienced 3.1 percent fewer FIO encounters compared to their 
White counterparts. The results for Asians and Other or Unknown race suspects remains 
unchanged. Gangs evidently are a priority in using FIO authority, and account for at least 
some of the racial disparity in FIO encounters.	  
The pattern for non-contact FIO activity in Model 3 is similar to the pattern 
shown in Model 2. The effects of gang membership increase from Model 2 to Model 3, 
suggesting even greater attention to gang members, albeit without contact or 
interpersonal interaction.  This makes sense, since gang members or reputed gang 
members are well known to the specialized Youth Violence Strike Force (YVSF, 
informally known as the gang unit), and their observations can be recorded for 
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surveillance and intelligence purposes. Perhaps observing gang member movements and 
associations has intelligence payoffs, which might explain and rationalize the use of 
police powers in this way. Since there is a privacy but not liberty interest at stake in these 
non-contact encounters, there is little regulatory leverage in this practice.  	  
The importance of Table 5 is the finding suggesting intense police attention to 
gang members by Boston police.  Gangs are thought to be an important source of the 
city’s gun violence problem, which leads to this attention, and gang membership also is 
skewed by both individual and neighborhood racial composition.260  	  
3.  Frisks and Searches by Suspect Race 	  
Table 6 shows that Black and Hispanic suspects were more likely to be frisked or 
searched during an FIO encounter, after controlling for non-racial suspect characteristics.  
Compared to White suspects, Black suspects were 12.4 percent more likely to be frisked / 
searched, and Hispanic subjects were 4.5 percent more likely to be frisked / searched 
during FIO encounters with arrest and gang status covariates included in the model. Gang 
members were 11.7 percent more likely to be frisked / searched during FIO encounters 
relative to their non-gang counterparts, controlling for other factors. For every additional 
arrest in their history, suspects were 1.8 percent more likely to be frisked or searched 
during FIO encounters. Asian and other race subjects were significantly less likely to be 
frisked / searched during FIO encounters when compared to White subjects.  Here, the 
gang effect that explained FIO activity in Table 5 seems to have comparable and 
independent influence on the decision to frisk as does the suspect’s race.	  
Table 6 here	  
 Taken together, Tables 5 and 6 show troubling racial disparities in the number of 
repeated FIO contacts and the probability of being frisked / searches experienced by 
Black and Hispanic suspects.  The effects in these tables are adjusted for the influences of 
age, gang membership, neighborhood and other relevant non-race influences.  In fact, we 
see the frisk estimates in Table 6 as conservative and expected to see even greater effects 
by suspect race considering the attention to gangs in this setting and BPD’s use of FIOs 
for intelligence gathering purposes, especially among gang members. Other Terry stop 
“programs” do not document non-contact observations, in line with the Supreme Court 
dicta limiting constitutional regulation to the physical aspect of investigative stops.261  
The large FIO differences in counts of encounters – both observational and face-to-face – 
compared to the incidence of frisks or searches suggests more extensive use of FIO 
reports to monitor gang members at a distance rather than repeatedly initiating physical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
260 Anthony A. Braga, David M. Hureau, and Andrew V. Papachristos, Deterring Gang-Involved 
Gun Violence: Measuring the Impact of Boston’s Operation Ceasefire on Street Gang Behavior, 
30 Journal of Quantitative Criminology 113-139 (2014); Andrew V. Papachristos, David M. 
Hureau, and Anthony A. Braga, The Corner and the Crew: The Influence of Geography and 
Social Networks on Gang Violence, 78 American Sociological Review 417-447 (2013); Anthony 
A. Braga, David Hureau, and Christopher Winship, Losing faith? Police, Black Churches and the 
Resurgence of Youth Violence in Boston, 6 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 141 (2008). 
261 Slobigin, Privacy at Risk, supra __. 
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contact to search them for weapons, drugs, or other contraband.  Perhaps this is a safety 
consideration, or it may be that there are information yields from non-contact encounters, 
such as understanding gang membership and associations, that can address tactical and 
policy goals.  Whatever the purpose and rational, more research is needed on the reasons 
and circumstances for this component of the FIO strategy, as well as its informational 
payoff.	  
	  
4.  FIO Activity by Unit and Officer Race	  
	  
Table 7 shows the effects of officer characteristics on FIO patterns.   There were 
large differences in FIO activity by officer race or ethnicity.  Black officers made 42.5 
percent fewer FIO reports per month compared to White officers, controlling for age, sex, 
rank, detective status, and assignment. Asian officers also made significantly fewer FIO 
reports.  Relative to White officers, Asian officers made 44.8 percent fewer FIO reports 
controlling for officer demographic, rank, and assignment covariates.  Hispanic officers 
made slightly smaller numbers of FIO reports than their White officers but the observed 
differences were not statistically significant. Controlling for assignment, rank, and other 
factors, older officers and female officers made significantly fewer FIO reports relative to 
their younger and male counterparts, respectively. 	  
Table 7 here	  
Unit assignment also was a significant predictor of officers’ FIO activity.  BPD 
officers assigned to the YVSF make almost 12 times as many FIO reports per month 
compared to officers assigned to other specialized units or policing districts, controlling 
for other factors. Their mission explains in part this emphasis: YVSF officers are charged 
with preventing outbreaks of gang violence. Completing FIO reports on gang member 
whereabouts, their associations and routine activities represent a central activity in 
pursuing that mission by massing information on the routine activities of gang members. 	  
Compared to line level patrol officers, Captains, Deputy Superintendents, and 
Superintendents make significantly fewer FIO reports holding other officer 
characteristics constant.  These high-ranking officers have extensive managerial 
responsibilities and, while they maintain a presence in the community, they are much less 
likely to be engaging in street-level law enforcement work.262 	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
262 The model used for the estimates in Table 7 is a zero-inflated negative binomial regression, 
which is employed in situations where there are large numbers of observations of zero events in 
the data and there are separate functions to determine any participation and then frequency of 
participation. See, for example, Kelvin KW Yau, Kui Wang, and Andy H. Lee, Zero-Inflated 
Negative Binomial Mixed Regression Modeling- of Over-Dispersed Count Data with Extra Zeros, 
45 Biometrical Journal 437 (2003).  This regression first estimates factors that explain when there 
are one or more events, and then explains the count of those events given one or more. The first 
stage analyzes the inflation factors associated with any participation.  The medical leave and 
administrative position variables were statistically significant predictors of zero FIO activity 
during the study time period, controlling for other factors.  BPD officers who were not able to 
perform their duties or were assigned to administrative positions generally do not complete FIO 
reports. 
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 The heavy influence of the YVSF officers on FIO activity, coupled with the race-
specific patterns shown in Table 7, leads to a further question: whether FIO activity 
within the YVSF command also varies by officer race. Table 8 shows the results of 
regressions with only officers having one or more FIO encounters, and disaggregating 
officers by race and YVSF assignment.  The six groups shown in Model 2 in Table 8 are 
compared to Asian and Other Race officers, a move that exploits the fact that there are so 
few Asian officers in the YVSF.  This permits direct comparisons of the regression 
estimates in Model 2.	  
Table 8 here	  
 Model 1 in Table 8 shows, for this narrower sample of officers, that White and 
Hispanic officers had substantially more FIO encounters that White officers.  Without 
controlling for assignment, the effect size for White officers is more than three times the 
size for Black officers; the effect size for Hispanic officers is more than three times the 
size for White officers.  Model 2 shows that this effect is an artifact of YVSF assignment.  
Within officer race, YVSF officers have far more frequent FIO activity than their non-
YVSF counterparts.  The differences again are very large.  White YVSF officers have 
about 6.5 times more FIO encounters per month than White officers in other units.  The 
differences for Black and Hispanic officers in the YVSF units are even greater.  	  
	  
 Here again, we see the importance of the YVSF unit in explaining racial 
disparities in FIO encounters between citizens and police.  This is not to say that there is 
no evidence of racially disparate treatment by officers in other commands; the data show 
that in fact, regardless of command, White officers and Hispanic officers are more active 
in FIO work.  Rather, Table 8 shows that within this focus of police efforts, the race 
disparities within officer racial categories are quite large, and officers from all racial and 
ethnic groups are more active once assigned to this command.  The results suggest an 
institutional dimension to explain officer FIO activity that is separate from an individual 
officer’s taste or preference for discrimination.	  
	  
5.  Frisks and Searches by Officer Race and Assignment 	  
Table 9 shows differences in frisk/search probability by officer race and 
assignment. Black officers were 15.0 percent less likely to frisk / search subjects during 
FIO encounters when compared to White officers, controlling for age, sex, rank, detective 
status, and assignment. Asian officers were also less likely to frisk / search FIO subjects.  
Relative to White officers, Asian officers were 32.6 percent less likely to frisk / search 
subjects during FIO encounters controlling for officer demographic, rank, and assignment 
covariates.  Hispanic officers were only 4.4 percent less likely to frisk / search subjects 
during FIO encounters holding the other variables constant; that result was not 
statistically significant. More experienced officers and female officers were significantly 
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less likely to frisk / search subjects during FIO encounters relative to their younger and 
male counterparts, respectively, controlling for assignment, rank, and other factors. 	  
Table 9 here	  
Two assignments show extremely elevated rates of frisk / search activity.  
Detectives were 49.5 percent more likely to frisk / search subjects during FIO encounters 
relative to non-detectives, controlling for assignment, rank, and other factors.  Given their 
responsibility for investigating unsolved crimes, detectives were presumably more likely 
to frisk / search FIO subjects for evidence of criminal activity during the course of an 
investigation.  YVSF officers were 24.3 percent more likely to frisk / search subjects 
during FIO encounters relative to non-YVSF officers, controlling for assignment, rank, 
detective status, and other factors. YVSF officers focus FIO encounters on gang members 
who pose a higher risk of carrying weapons relative to other FIO subjects, which explains 
in part their preferences for search relative to other BPD officers.  Compared to line level 
patrol officers, Sergeants, Lieutenants Captains, Deputy Superintendents, and 
Superintendents were significantly less likely to frisk / search subjects during FIO 
encounters holding other officer characteristics constant.  	  
Despite the frequent FIO activity by YVSF officers, these results suggest that they 
exercise caution in proceeding from an encounter to a frisk or search.  YVSF officers 
were far more active in FIO activity, by orders of magnitude, than their non-YVSF 
counterparts, yet only a fraction of their encounters proceeded to a frisk or search. 	  
The disparity between FIO encounters by this group and frisks or searches could 
suggest problems in their formation of the requisite suspicion necessary to conduct a frisk 
or search contingent on a stop.  The high rate of non-frisk encounters suggests a reduced 
level of reasonable suspicion in many encounters that falls below constitutional 
thresholds permitting a frisk – primarily officer safety or suspicion of weapon possession 
– or a search.  Searches require probable cause, a stricter standard.263  Another 
interpretation of this gap could simply be that the purpose of YVSF encounters is simply 
to establish contact, to signal to young males under suspicion that the police are present 
and watching, and to gather intelligence.  This may be a reasoned activity in terms of 
policy, but it falls short of being reasonable, under constitutional requirements for even a 
momentary deprivation of liberty and detention.  ‘Getting it wrong’ at a high rate 
suggests problems in the bases of suspicion animating a stop, a finding with implications 
for constitutional regulation of FIO activity.264	  
	  
5. Officer-Suspect Racial Asymmetries 	  
 The higher incidence of FIO encounters for non-White suspects and also 
encounters initiated by White officers suggest the possibility of discrimination.  But these 
results leave open the question of statistical versus preference-based discrimination.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
263 Massachusetts follows constitutional standards in Terry v. Ohio.  See, Commonwealth v. 
Torres, 433 Mass. 669, 745 N.E.2d 945, 948 (2001). 
264 See, for example, Floyd v City of New York, Opinion and Order, supra note 43 (finding that the 
high rate of unproductive stops was a sign of inaccuracy in the formation of reasonable suspicion 
that is a prerequisite to an investigative stop). 
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Most studies testing for discrimination have relied on “hit rates” or the probability of 
guilt to distinguish between these forms of discrimination.  Generally, we assume an 
absence of preference-based discrimination if racial differences in police encounters are 
independent of the race of the police officer.265 But if there are differences in, for 
example, the stops of Black suspects by White officers compared to Black officers, we 
might conclude preferences for discrimination.  But that evidence alone is only a partial 
explanation.  Those preferences might be explained by the greater ease with which 
officers may be able to approach and conduct searches of persons of their own race or 
ethnicity.  Alternately, if officers are not randomly assigned to neighborhoods, then Black 
officers in White neighborhoods where crime rates may be lower will conduct fewer 
stops of Whites.  Since crime rates are higher in predominantly Black neighborhoods in 
Boston and other cities, the opposite condition would be observed: White officers would 
have more encounters with Black suspects.  Testing for discrimination using these 
metrics therefore requires not only knowledge of officer and suspect race, but also 
controls for the crime rates of the different areas where they patrol and encounter 
suspects.266 	  
Table 10a shows the results of analyses that disaggregate patterns of FIO 
encounters by both officer race and suspect race four racial groups.  We estimated models 
of the count of FIO encounters using negative binomial regressions, following the 
functional form used in the previous models of FIO activity.  Controls included age and 
gender of the suspect and age, gender, rank and assignment for officers.  Separate models 
were conducted for each officer race group.  Fixed effects for police districts controlled 
for differential exposure of officers to crime and to different local racial concentrations. 
The first three columns compare FIO reports of each suspect racial group by officers of 
each race to FIO reports done by White officers.  The fourth column compares FIO’s by 
White officers to FIO reports of Black Officers.  The cells in Table 10a show the 
incidence rate ratio for each comparison.  To test for different discrimination patterns in 
frisks and searches, we use multilevel logistic regression models as the functional form to 
estimate the probability of a frisk or search across racial groups. The results in Table 10b 
show the odds ratio for each comparison.	  
	  
Table 10a and 10b here	  
Table 10a shows higher FIO activity for White officers for suspects of all races, 
including White suspects, compared to Black officers.  White officers have significantly 
more encounters with White suspects than they have with suspects of other races.  On the 
surface, this suggests greater FIO activity compared to Black officers across all suspect 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
265 See, for example, Shamena Anwar and Hanming Fang, An Alternative Test of Racial Profiling 
in Motor Vehicle Searches: Theory and Evidence, 96 American Economic Review 127 (2006).  
See, also, Kate Antonovics and Brian Knight, A New Look at Racial Profiling, supra note 219.  
David Bjerk, Racial Profiling and Statistical Discrimination, supra note 201.   
266 This approach also discounts the problem of the “suspicious outsider,” or the person who 
crosses neighborhoods of different racial composition. This problem may be more salient in 
studies of vehicle stops where crossing of neighborhood boundaries is more common and 
feasible.  Here, our analysis examines pedestrian stops almost exclusively. 
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race groups, but not preferences for stops of one racial group over others.   Column 1 
shows that Black officers, compared to White officers, are significantly less active across 
all suspect race groups, again suggesting discrimination other than preference-based.	  
However, comparing within-suspect race results across rows, suggests preferences 
for discrimination by White officers.  FIO activity Column 4 in Table 10a shows that 
White officers have about 55 percent more FIO encounters per month with Black 
suspects compared to Black officers.  Black officers have 35 percent fewer stops per 
month of Black suspects compared to White officers.  This between-officer within-
suspect comparison suggest preferences by White officers compared to Black officers in 
FIO activity for Black suspects.  Similar differences are evident between Black and 
White officers in stops of Hispanic suspects, Asian suspects, and White suspects. 	  
The pattern for frisks and searches in Table 10b is similar.  White officers are 
more likely to frisk or search both Black and White suspects compared to cross-racial 
frisks or searches by Black officers.  Black officers again show lower rates of frisks and 
searches compared to White officers, and are equally likely to frisk or search both White 
and Black suspects. White officers are 23 percent more likely to frisk or search a Black 
suspect, but Black officers are 19 percent less likely to search Black suspects compared 
to White officers. Hispanic officers are less likely compared to White officers to frisk 
Black and White suspects, while White officers are more likely than Hispanic officers to 
frisk or search both Black and White suspects.  	  
One way to understand Table 10a is that while White officers may not 
discriminate between suspects of different races, they do have stronger preferences for 
stops between races than Black officers.  This is evident for suspects of all races.  This 
presents a more complex picture of the preference-statistical discrimination distinction 
than previous studies have reported.  White officers are more active than are Black or 
Hispanic officers in FIO activity overall, but they also prefer within each race to conduct 
FIOs relative to Black officers.  There may not be preferences by race, but there does 
appear to be stronger preferences for FIO activity overall.  Put another way, White 
officers are biased toward everyone compared to Black, Hispanic or Asian officers.	  
Given the higher rates of FIO encounters by YVSF officers, we tested to see if the 
results in Tables 10a and 10b would be robust to the exclusion of those officers.  The 
results led to the same conclusions, with only minor changes in the regression 
coefficients and standard errors once the YVSF officer were excluded.  We observed the 
same mixed pattern of statistical and preference-based discrimination that analyses with 
the full sample produced.	  
	  
VI.  CONCLUSION	  
	  
Two features of Boston’s practices of investigative stops distinguish it from the 
“new policing” regimes in other large cities.  First, Boston focuses a significant portion of 
its field investigation activity on suspected and actual gang members.  Boston police have 
pursued this targeted strategy within its FIO activity for quite some time.267 This is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
267 David Kennedy, et al., Reducing Gun Violence: The Boston Gun Project’s Operation 
Ceasefire Series: Research Report, 9 NCJ (2001). 
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consistent with the elevated rates of crime, especially youth crime, in the neighborhoods 
with the highest concentration of gang members.268  In contrast, New York City’s 
investigative stop program only recently reoriented from widespread investigative stops 
to a more spatially concentrated effort focused on gang activity in public housing sites.269 
Second, the Boston Terry stop design includes both contact encounters and non-contact 
observations of suspects.  Intelligence and surveillance may not be unusual in other cities, 
but rarely is there formal recording of observations that do not convert into contact 
encounters. Boston is distinctive in recording those observations in the same database as 
its contact encounters. 	  
The records of these encounters provided a basis to assess the claims of 
discrimination that have infected the contemporary practice of Terry stops or 
investigative stops as practiced in the “new policing.”  We conducted analyses to assess 
the allocation of officers and FIO activity by neighborhood and suspect race, using 
metrics and methods that were cited in recent litigation on other investigative stop 
programs.270  Both crime and race contribute to variations over time and place in FIO 
activity.  The regressions are estimated so that effects of each are mutually adjusted. The 
results are robust to the exclusion of the specialized and very active YVSF gang unit, 
suggesting a generalized pattern of preferences for encounters with Black and Hispanic 
suspects.  We expect a rational allocation of police activity to match variation in times 
and places with local crime rates, and we observe that to be the case.  But we also 
observe a marginal effect of racial composition in census tracts, suggesting statistical 
discrimination in those areas.   	  
The evidence suggests a complex answer to the question of whether that 
discrimination is evidence of bias.  Using a racial mismatch model, we find that White 
officers were consistently more active than Black or Hispanic officers in conducting FIO 
reports, regardless of suspect race.  But within suspect race, the preference of White 
officers to FIO Black suspects is far greater than Black officers’ preference to FIO Black 
or Hispanic suspects.  And Black officers are less likely to FIO a White suspect than is a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
268 Anthony Braga, et al., Deterring Gang-Involved Gun Violence (2014), supra note 264; Andrew 
V. Papachristos, et al., The Corner and the Crew (2013), supra note 264: Anthony Braga, et al., 
Losing Faith? (2008), supra note 264. 
269 Richard Aborn, Crime Commission Statement on NYPD’s Operation Crew Cut, October 2, 
2012 at www.nycrimecommission.org/pdfs/ccc-10-02-12.pdf (“Operation Crew Cut is a smart and 
proactive approach to curtail youth violence which accounts for 30% of shootings in New York 
City. By utilizing the latest technology, doubling the size of the gang violence unit and 
coordinating closely with District Attorneys, the New York City Police Department is making 
effective use of targeted resources to not only combat crime, but create an overall deterrent effect. 
This is the kind of smart solution which keeps our crime rate low, and continues to set New York 
apart as one of the safest large cities in the world.") 
270 David Floyd et al. v City of New York, Opinion and Order, supra note 43. See, also, Ian Ayres 
and Jonathan Borowsky, A Study of Racially Disparate Outcomes in the Los Angeles Police 
Department, ACLU of Southern California (2008); Plaintiffs’ Fifth Report to Court and Monitor 
on Stop and Frisk Practices, Mahiri Bailey et al. v City of Philadelphia, C.A. 10-5952, Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania (2015)  
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White officer.  These patterns are robust to the exclusion of YVSF officers, which 
suggests that the results also are robust to the exclusion of gang members.	  
Is this evidence of bias, or preference-based discrimination? The data are not well 
suited to answer this question.  We defined statistical discrimination as a rational decision 
to focus efforts on one group or to exclude another group from engagements of any sort.  
Following Gary Becker’s notion of discrimination, officers who stopped Black or 
Hispanic suspects more often perceived a net benefit in the form of increased attention to 
crime detection.271 As a matter of efficiency, attention to populations with a lower 
probability of return would sacrifice the returns in crime control from allocating attention 
to the presumed higher rate group. Becker also identifies discrimination based on tastes 
or values, where the decision maker discounts known facts.  In the case of FIO activity, 
decision makers may inflate crime propensity beyond its true value, leading to a 
subjectively rational but still preference-based form of discrimination.  In our study, the 
marginal rate of FIOs by census tract based on racial composition after controlling for 
local crime rates may reflect that type of process.  It suggests that subjective evaluations 
of the returns from a FIO encounter may be inflated based on race-based distortions of 
information.	  
Kenneth Arrow described this process as “positive valuation” of one group with 
higher expected return, even if that valuation is inflated.272 Arrow describes sources of 
“cheap information” that might help a decision maker to identify a discrimination target a 
low cost: skin color, poor neighborhoods, or other substitutes for crime.  These sources of 
cheap information may also prime decision makers – police officers, in this case – to 
increase their valuation of the suspect’s behavior.  Since there is no cost for a wrong 
decision, there are only weak incentives to correct or update that information.  	  
Using the officer-suspect racial mismatch metric, the results suggest preference-
based discrimination. But without additional evidence of the outcomes of FIO 
encounters, or the reasonable suspicion bases animating these events, we cannot fully 
explain the motivations for FIO encounters.  These encounters may be efficient, or they 
may simply be a form of routine administrative searches based on actuarial suspicion in 
the absence of individualized or particularized suspicion273 or a clear expectation of 
arrests or seizures of weapons.274  These encounters may simply reflect an institutional 
bias or norm based on a closed system of information that reinforces command staff and 
individual officers’ prior beliefs about whom to observe or engage, setting aside 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
271 See, Gary S. Becker, The Economics of Discrimination (2nd ed.) 10 (1971) 
272 Kenneth J. Arrow, The Theory of Discrimination, in Discrimination in Labor Markets (Orley 
Achenfelder and Albert Reiss, eds., 1973)  
273 Eve Bresinke Primus, Disentangling Administrative Searches, 111 Colum. L. Rev. 254 (2011) 
(defining administrative search exceptions to Fourth Amendment regulation to justify airport 
searches, subway backpack searches, employer drug testing, and vehicle checkpoints). 
274 See, e.g., Brooks Holland, The Road ‘Round Edmond: Steering Through Primary Purposes 
and Crime Control Agendas, 111 Penn State L. Rev. 293 (2006) (citing the U.S. Supreme Court 
opinion in Edmond v City of Indianapolis, 531 U.S. 37, 44 (2000), stating that “[w]e cannot 
sanction stops justified only by the generalized and ever-present possibility that interrogation and 
inspection may reveal that any giver motorist has committed some crime”). 
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questions of fairness or efficiency.  FIOs here may be based on location, peer network, or 
other actuarial markers that substitute for individual markers of suspicion, raising Fourth 
Amendment concerns.  Explaining how those factors translate into perceptions, decisions, 
attributions or behaviors requires different research designs.275 
Still, evidence of officer race disparities suggests that there is more than just 
statitcal discrimination or institutional preference at work here.  That these stops are 
disproportionately target minority suspects in non-white neighborhoods beyond what 
local crime rates predict, raises Equal Protection concerns that seem to be collateral 
consequences of the “new policing.”	  
	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
275 Several studies have used research designs that vary race and use a variety of cues to assess 
how race consciously or subconsciously affects decision making by legal actors. These studies 
differ from the officer-suspect mismatch paradigm in that they examine specific cues that 
influence officers’ perceptions and permit bias to infect decisions from shooting at suspects to the 
construction of pre-sentence probation reports for trial courts.  Many are laboratory experiments, 
which strengthens their internal validity but to some extent at the cost of external validity 
considerations of context and multiple causation.  Others exploit natural variation in legal settings 
to discern the influence of race on decision making, increasing their external validity but at some 
unknown cost to internal validity and measurement equivalence on race.  In most but not all 
cases, these studies show evidence of bias toward African-American suspects or defendants.  See, 
for example, Joshua Correll, Sean M. Hudson, Steffanie Guillermo and Debbie S. Ma, The Police 
Officer’s Dilemma: A Decade of Research on Racial Bias in the Decision to Shoot, 8 Journal of 
Social and Personality Compass 201 (2014); Joshua Correll, Bernd Wittenbrink, Matthew T. 
Crawford, and Melody S. Sadler, Sterotypic Vision: How Stereotypes Disambiguate Visual 
Stimuli, 1089 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 219 (2015); Modupe Akinola, and 
Wendy Berry Mendes, Stress-Induced Cortisol Facilitates Threat-Related Decision Making 
among Police Officers, 126 Behavioral Neuroscience 167 (2012); Sandra Graham and Brian S. 
Lowery, Priming Unconscious Racial Stereotypes about Adolescent Offenders, 28 Law and 
Human Behavior 483 (2004);  Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Paul G. Davies, Valerie J. Purdie-Vaughns, 
and Sheri Lynn Johnson, Looking Deathworthy: Perceived Stereotypicality of Black Defendants 
Predicts Capital-Sentencing Outcomes, 17 Psychological Science 383 (2006); Geoffrey P. Alpert, 
John M. MacDonald, and Roger G. Dunham, Police Suspicion and Discretionary Decision 
Making During Citizen Stops, 43 Criminology 407 (2005);, George S. Bridges and Sara Steen, 
Racial Disparities in Official Assessments of Juvenile Offenders: Attributional Stereotypes as 
Mediating Mechanisms,  63 American Sociological Review 554 (1998). 
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Table 1.  Age, Gender, and Race of Unique BPD FIO Subjects and Officers 
 	   	   	   	   	  
 
FIO Subjec ts ,  
N=72,619 
 
FIO Off i cers ,  
N=1750a 
	   	   	   	   	   	   N Percent 
	  
N Percent 
Gender 
	   	   	   	   	  Male 59,438 81.8 
	  
1,558 89 
Female 13,181 18.2 
	  
192 11 
 
	   	   	   	   	  Age 
	   	   	   	   	  Below 18 9,201 12.7 
	  
0 0 
18 – 24 24,471 33.7 
	  
10 0.6 
25 – 30 12,375 17 
	  
208 11.9 
31 – 35 6,417 8.8 
	  
286 16.3 
36 – 40 5,636 7.8 
	  
356 20.3 
41 – 50 9,650 13.3 
	  
609 34.8 
51 and older 4,869 6.7 
	  
281 16.1 
 	   	   	   	   	  Mean 29.2 
	   	  
41.3 
	  Median  26 
	   	  
41 
	  Range 12 to 71 years  
	  
23 to 64 years 
 
	   	   	   	   	  Race  
	   	   	   	   	  Black 30,849 42.5 
	  
418 23.9 
White 25,758 35.5 
	  
1,139 65.1 
Hispanic 9,693 13.3 
	  
150 8.6 
Asian / Other 1,321 1.8 
	  
43 2.5 
Unknown 4,998 6.9 
	  
0 0 
 
	   	   	   	   	  Selected Characteristics 
	   	   	   	   	  Subjects 
	   	   	   	   	       Gang member 3,967 5.5 
	   	   	       Prior arrest (1+) 35,256 48.5 
	   	   	  Officers   	   	   	  
    Gang Unit (YVSF) 65 3.7 
	   	   	      Detective (any rank) 212 12.1 
	   	   	      Patrol Officer 1,379 78.8 
	   	   	      Patrol Sergeant 130 7.4 
	   	   	      Patrol Lieutenant / Captain 23 1.3 
	   	   	      Dep. Supt. / Superintendent 6 0.3 	  	   	  	   	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  a.  These are the officers who have had one or more FIO encounter over the study interval.	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Table 2. FIO Report Distribution by Unique Subjects 
       N of N 
Subjects  
% 
Subjects  
Cum. % 
Subjects  Sum FIOs  
% Cum. % 
FIOs  FIOs  FIOs  
51+  211 0.3 0.3 14,886 7.5 7.5 
25 – 50  671 0.9 1.2 22,314 11.2 18.7 
10 – 24  2,933 4 5.2 42,787 21.5 40.2 
5 – 9  4,926 6.8 12 31,798 15.9 56.1 
2 – 4  14,860 20.5 32.5 38,528 19.3 75.4 
1 only  49,018 67.5 100 49,018 24.6 100 
Total 72,619 100 100 199,331 100 100 
	  
	  
Table 3. FIO Report Distribution by Unique BPD Officers 
 	   	   	   	   	   	  N of  N 
Officers  
%  Cum % 
Officers  Sum FIOs  
%  Cum % 
FIO  FIOs  Officers  FIO  
1,000+  28 1.2 1.2 42,399 21.2 21.2 
500 - 999  65 2.8 4 44,153 22.1 43.3 
250 - 499  128 5.4 9.4 44,809 22.4 65.7 
100 - 249  253 10.7 20.1 39,693 19.8 85.5 
50 - 99  214 9.1 29.2 15,179 7.6 93.1 
1 - 49 1,062 45 74.2 13,870 6.9 100 
Zero  609 25.8 100 0 0 100 
Total  2,359 100 100 200,103 100 100 
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Table 4. Negative Binomial Regressions of Monthly FIO Report Counts Controlling for 
Census Tract Characteristics, Crime, Police Activity, and Other Conditions for Three Racial 
Benchmarks (IRR’s, SE, p) 
    Residents  Arrestees  Crime Victims  
Percent Black      1.022 (.006) **  1.025 (.005) **  1.029 (.009) ** 
Percent Hispanic     1.041 (.008) **  1.016 (.008) *  1.040 (.011) ** 
Percent Asian / other    1.020 (.012)  0.917 (.052)  0.967 (.063) 
Percent Unknown Race    ----   ----   0.922 (.015) ** 
Total Crime (logged, lagged)   1.106 (.026) **  1.125 (.036) **  1.091 (.027) ** 
Disadvantage Index    0.894 (.157)  0.911 (.178)  0.924 (.143) 
Percent Foreign Born    1.016 (.009) +  1.017 (.007) *  1.019 (.009) * 
Patrol Strength     1.006 (.006)  1.002 (.005)  1.006 (.006) 
Moran’s I (lagged)    1.285 (.369)    1.124 (.280)  1.054 (.282) 
Constant     0.063 (.052) **  0.168 (.131) *  0.916 (.035) ** 
 
District Fixed Effects?   Yes   Yes   Yes 
Year Fixed Effects?   Yes   Yes   Yes 
Season Fixed Effects?   Yes   Yes   Yes 
Standard Errors Clustered by Tract?  Yes   Yes   Yes 
 
Observations      8,303   8,303   8,303 
Groups       173   173   173 
Wald Chi-Square       460.36   492.63   582.82 
Wald degrees of freedom        25   25   26 
Wald Chi-Square p     .000   .000   .000 
 
Notes: Estimates reported as Incident Rate Ratios.  Robust standard errors were clustered by census 
tract.  Percent White is the reference category for the resident, arrestee, and suspect race dummy 
variables. The natural log of the total number of residents, total number of arrestees, and total 
number of suspects for each tract-month were used as exposure offsets in the respective regression 
models.  Significance: + p<=.10, * p<=.05, ** p<=.01.  
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Table 5. Negative Binomial Regression of the Number of FIO Reports by Individual Suspect 
Characteristics Controlling for Gang Membership (IRR, SE, p) 
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Non-Contac t  
 
	   	  
All FIO Repor t s  FIO Repor t s  
	   	   	  
Model  1 
	  
Model  2  
	  
Model  3 
 
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Black Suspect 
	  
1.725 (.026) ** 1.088 (.011) ** 1.047 (.010) ** 
Hispanic Suspect 
	  
1.136 (.026) ** 0.969 (.013) * 
	  
0.972 (.012) * 
Asian / Other Suspect 
	  
0.725 (.024) ** 0.791 (.021) ** 0.757 (.021) ** 
Unknown Race 
	  
0.501 (.007) ** 0.681 (.007) ** 0.483 (.007) ** 
Age 
	   	  
0.990 (.001) ** 0.988 (.001) ** 0.979 (.001) ** 
Female Suspect 
	   	  
0.670 (.011) ** 0.830 (.009) ** 0.811 (.008) ** 
Gang Member 
	  
---- 
	  
3.339 (.076) ** 4.171 (.075) ** 
Arrest History  
	  
---- 
	  
1.108 (.001) ** 1.151 (.001) ** 
Constant 
	   	  
2.788 (.058) ** 2.103 (.029) ** 2.091 (.029) ** 
 	   	   	   	   	   	   	  District Fixed Effects? 
	  
Yes 
	  
Yes 
	  
Yes 
Year Fixed Effects? 
	  
Yes 
	  
Yes 
	  
Yes 
Season Fixed Effects? 
	  
Yes 
	  
Yes 
	  
Yes 
SE’s Clustered by Tract?  Yes 
	  
Yes 
	  
Yes 
 	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Observations 
	   	  
72,619 
	  
72,619 
	  
72,619 
Log Pseudo-likelihood 
	  
-153,503.52 
	  
-133,092.42 
	  
-117,323.91 
Wald Chi-Square 
	  
9,269.43 
	  
22,813.61 
	  
19,112.43 
Wald Chi-Square p 
	  
0.000 
	  
0.000 
	  
0.000 
	  Notes: Models estimated with robust standard errors clustered by tract.  Race variables 
contrasted with White.  Significance:   + p<=.10, * p<=.05, ** p<=.01    
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Table 6. Hierarchical Logistic Regression Estimating Impact of 
Suspect Race on Probability of a Frisk and/or Search  
(OR, SE, p) 
Characteristic OR SE p 
Age 0.977 -0.001 ** 
Female 0.347 -0.007 ** 
Suspect Race – Black 1.124 -0.018 ** 
Suspect Race – Hispanic  1.045 -0.018 ** 
Suspect Race – Asian/Other 0.837 -0.021 ** 
Suspect Race – Unknown  0.588 -0.018 ** 
Gang Member 1.117 -0.017 ** 
Arrest History 1.018 -0.001 ** 
Constant 0.459 -0.082 *** 
Observations 199,331  Log Likelihood -121413.72  Wald Chi-square 2603.82  p(Wald Chi-square) 0.000   
 Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by tract.  Fixed effects for police 
districts, year and season.  Random effects for tract characteristics (not 
shown) include tract population (logged), total violent crime in tract (logged, 
lagged), disadvantage index, and Moran’s I.  Race variables contrasted with 
White suspects. Significance: + p<=.10, * p<=.05, ** p<=.01 
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Table 7. Zero Inflated Negative Binomial Regressions of FIO 
Counts on Officer Characteristics  (IRR, SE, p) 
Character i s t i c  OR SE p 
Years on Job 0.902 -0.007 ** 
Female 0.377 -0.069 ** 
Officer Race    
  Black 0.575 -0.066 ** 
  Hispanic 0.901 -0.156  
  Asian 0.552 -0.121 ** 
Officer Rank     
  Detective 0.885 -0.187  
   Sergeant or Lt. 0.893 -0.151  
   Captain or Command 0.778 -0.133 * 
Officer Unit     
  Mobile Operations 1.021 -0.583  
   Drug Control 1.131 -0.263  
   YVSF 11.953 -2.655 ** 
   Other Patrol 0.358 -0.112 ** 
   Other Investigation 0.215 -0.069 ** 
Constant 206.322 -49.72 ** 
    
Zero Inflation Parameters      Administrative Assignment 4.946 -0.404 ** 
  On Leave 4.592 -0.389 ** 
  Constant -4.734 -0.301 ** 
Observations 2,359  
Log Likelihood -9,833.14  
Wald Chi-square 1059.06  
p (Chi-square) 0   
Notes: Models estimated with robust standard errors, not clustered 
due to mobility of officers.  Fixed effects for police district, year, 
season, and police district. Significance: + p<=.10, * p<=.05, ** 
p<=.01 
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Table 8. Negative Binomial Regression of the Number of FIO Reports by 
Officer Race and YVSF Status (IRR, SE, p) 
 
	  
Model 1 
	  
Model 2  
	  Age 
	  
.916 (.006) ** .922 (.006) ** 
Female 
	  
.307 (.059) ** .383 (.074) ** 
White Officer 
	  
1.752 (.335) ** ---- 
	  Black Officer 
	  
1.171 (.243) 
	  
---- 
	  Hispanic Officer 
	  
1.613 (.338) * ---- 
	  White YVSF ---- 
	  
9.022 (2.136) ** 
White Other  ---- 
	  
1.488 (.287) * 
Black YVSF  ---- 
	  
8.358 (2.081) ** 
Black Other 
	  
---- 
	  
.826 (.170) 
	  Hispanic YVSF ---- 
	  
10.788 (3.706) ** 
Hispanic Other ---- 
	  
1.112 (.265) 
	  Constant 	  	   191.969 (37.743) ** 175.144 (34.663) ** 
 	   	   	   	   	  Observations  1,750 
	  
 1,750 
	  Log Pseudo-likelihood -9,245.30 
	  
-9,116.84 
	  Wald Chi-Square     312.99 
	  
    652.49 
	  Wald Chi-Square p 0 	  	   0 	  	  
Notes: Models estimated with robust standard errors, not clustered due to mobility of 
officers.  Officers included in this analysis made at least one FIO report between 2007 
and 2010. Asian is the contrast category for the FIO officer race tests.  
Significance:    + p<=.10, * p<=.05, ** p<=.01 
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Table 9. Hierarchical Logistic Regression Estimating 
Impact of Officer Race on Probability of a Frisk or 
Search (OR, SE, p) 
Characteristic OR SE p 
Years on Job 0.973 (.007) ** 
Female 0.618 (.069) ** 
Officer Race    
  Black 0.850 (.066) ** 
  Hispanic 0.956 (.156)  
  Asian 0.674 (.121) ** 
Officer Rank     
  Detective 1.495 (.187)  
   Sergeant or Lt. 0.847 (.151)     Captain or 
Command 0.5 (.133) * 
Officer Unit     
   YVSF 1.243 (2.655) ** 
Constant 315.322 (49.720) ** 
Observations 200,103  
Log Likelihood -123,410.23  
Wald Chi-square 1,618.47  
p (Chi-square) 0.000   
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by police district. Random 
effects (not shown) included census tract population (logged), total 
crime in tract (logged, lagged), disadvantage index, and Moran’s I. 
Fixed effects for year, season, and police district.  Significance:   + 
p<=.10, * p<=.05, ** p<=.01  
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Table 10a. Negative Binomial Regression Analyses of the Joint 
Distribution of Officer Race and Subject Race on FIO Counts  
(IRR, SE) 
	  
         Off i c er  Race 
Subjec t  Race Black Hispanic Asian White 
 	   	   	   	  Black .645** .865 .504** 1.548* 
	  
(.071) (.139) (.112) (.169) 
 	   	   	   	  Hispanic .581** .128 .664 1.722** 
	  
(.063) (.170) (.171) (.188) 
 
	   	   	   	  Asian / Other .616** 1.219 1.113 1.623** 
	  
(.089) (.334) (.281) (.235) 
 
	   	   	   	  White .426** .731* .702* 2.345** 
	  
(.041) (.103) (.200) (.227) 
	  
	  
	  
	  
Table 10b. Hierarchical Logistic Regression Analyses of the Joint 
Distribution of Officer Race and Subject Race on the Likelihood of 
a Frisk / Search (OR, SE) 
	  
        Off i c er  Race 
Subjec t  Race Black Hispanic Asian White 
 	   	   	   	  Black .813** .922** .649** 1.229** 
	  
(.014) (.020) (.038) (.021) 
 
	   	   	   	  Hispanic .991 .968 .605** 1.008 
	  
(.041) (.040) (.068) (.041) 
 
	   	   	   	  Asian / Other .949 1.031 .724* 1.052 
	  
(.060) (.071) (.112) (.066) 
 
	   	   	   	  White .874** .926* .811** 1.143** 
	  	   (.032) (.035) (.057) (.042) 
Note: Models estimated with robust standard errors clustered by police district.  
Estimates control for suspect and officer age and gender.  Fixed effects include 
year, season, police district, and officer rank and assignment. White is the contrast 
category for officer race variables in the regressions in the first three columns of 
coefficients.  Black is the contrast category for the White officer race dummy 
variable in the regressions in the fourth column.  Significance: + p<=.10, * p<=.05, 
** p<=.01 
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Figure 1.  Google N-Gram of “Racial Profiling” 
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Figure 2.  Crime Rate and Population Demography, 2010 
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Figure 3.  Predicted Counts of FIO’s per Month by Percent Black and Hispanic Residents in Tract, 
2007-10, Controlling for Crime and Social Conditions 
	  
	  
